

# 4.3: U.S. Government Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts within the scope of Afghan Justice Sector Assistance

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## Summary

This chapter provides an overview of the United States (U.S.) government anti-corruption efforts within the scope of Afghan justice sector assistance. This chapter includes a review of U.S. anti-corruption support to specific Afghan anti-corruption agencies including the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, the Major Crimes Task Force, the Anti-Corruption Unit of the Attorney General’s Office, and the Anti-Corruption Tribunal.

## Introduction

“The presence of [ . . . ] widespread and entrenched corruption in Afghanistan is widely assessed to be undermining Afghan public and international donor confidence in the ability to establish [rule of law] in Afghanistan.”<sup>1</sup> The U.S. government and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan affirmed the importance of anti-corruption efforts in the *Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between The United States of America and The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan* (Strategic Partnership Agreement), stating that the “Parties shall fight decisively against all forms of corruption.”<sup>2</sup> The U.S. views combating corruption in Afghanistan as crucial to the long term stability of the country because the “current level of corruption undermines security, development, rule of law, the Afghan government, and acts as an enabler for the country’s illicit narcotics trade.”<sup>3</sup> This chapter provides an overview of the U.S. anti-corruption efforts within the scope of rule of law objectives.

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<sup>1</sup> Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RS41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman (Nov. 9, 2010)(hereinafter CRS Report), p. 5: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/152606.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (May 2, 2012)(hereinafter Strategic Partnership Agreement), V. Social and Economic Development, para. 4(a), p. 6: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspassignedtext.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, Revision 1, February 2010, p. 15: [http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ICMCP\\_Feb\\_2011final.pdf](http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ICMCP_Feb_2011final.pdf). Note: The 2012 U.S. Civilian-Military Plan has been updated by the U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan August 2013 (Revision 2)(hereinafter Civil-Military Strategy): <http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-CivilMilitaryAfghanFramework-2013.pdf>.

## U.S. Anti-Corruption Strategic Framework for Afghanistan

One of the key strategic elements of the U.S. Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy (Regional Strategy) is to strengthen Afghan governance.<sup>4</sup> A key initiative for strengthening Afghan governance is reducing corruption.<sup>5</sup> “Major efforts include improving financial oversight; building judicial capacity to investigate, prosecute and remove corrupt officials; and education and empowerment of the Afghan public to participate in transparent and accountable governance.”<sup>6</sup> The Regional Strategy calls for “renewed international effort to encourage prosecutions for narcotics and corruption-related crimes” as well as expanded support for the Anti-Corruption Tribunal; Major Crimes Task Force; Anti-Corruption Unit; the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption; and Mobile Finance.<sup>7</sup> In line with the Regional Strategy, the U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan provides:<sup>8</sup>

The second rule of law priority is to combat corruption within Afghan government agencies and institutions. Addressing corruption within its ranks will improve [Afghanistan Government] legitimacy and have a positive impact on socio-economic development in Afghanistan. Therefore, the [U.S. government] will help build the technical capacity of key justice sector, other rule of law, and law enforcement institutions to receive and manage on-budget assistance, combat corruption through administrative reform, and fight the culture of impunity by pressing Afghan authorities to pursue convictions in high-profile cases of corruption. The [U.S. government] will also support efforts to increase [the Afghan Government’s] capacity to improve border regimes and customs collection, assist Afghans with implementing systems that help reduce corruption, advise and mentor relevant ministries and law enforcement agencies, and develop [Afghanistan] legislation that targets corruption.

## U.S. Support to Afghan Anti-Corruption Efforts

In keeping with the strategic framework, the U.S. has initiated programs in support of Afghanistan’s anti-corruption efforts. U.S. anti-corruption efforts extend into almost every sector including commercial and trade programs, banking and financial programs, as well as customs and tax programs. This chapter focuses on U.S. anti-corruption efforts within the scope

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<sup>4</sup> Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Updated February 2010 (hereinafter Regional Strategy), p. i:

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. Other key governance initiatives include enhancing sub-national governance, enhancing Afghan Capacity (specifically the Afghan Civil Service Commission), encouraging merit-based appointments, leveraging U.S. assistance, and ensuring effective representation. See Ibid, Regional Strategy, pp.8-9.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Civil-Military Strategy, *supra* note 3, p. 9.

of justice sector assistance.<sup>9</sup> Specifically, the following sections focus on U.S. programs in support of Afghanistan’s current anti-corruption bodies including the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, the Major Crimes Task Force, the Anti-Corruption Unit of the Attorney General’s Office, and the Anti-Corruption Tribunal in Kabul.

### **The High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption**

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the primary U.S. agency supporting the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO) through its Assistance for Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Authority (4A).<sup>10</sup> USAID plans to provide the HOO roughly \$5 million, of the \$9.4 million project budget, for the HOO to build capacity at the central level.<sup>11</sup> The activities of the 4A project related to supporting the HOO are described as follows:<sup>12</sup>

- Assist in the development and implementation of a sound institutional and sustainability strategy, including implementation of recommendations contained in the HOO’s Human Resources (HR) Assessment Report
- Technical assistance to: develop the Standard Operating Procedure manual for the HOO’s HR department; revise the HOO’s Selection and Recruitment Policy; develop the HOO’s on-line asset registration capacity; conduct Vulnerability to Corruption Assessments (VCAs) in government bodies to improve select business processes and reform existing systems; and, draft the Whistleblower’s Protection Legislation
- Conduct a desk audit to reconcile the HOO’s personnel with payroll

In January 2014, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported the U.S. Department of State and USAID “have agreed that the HOO, while technically capable of functioning as an effective anticorruption agency, is dysfunctional, ineffective and politicized. As a result, USAID terminated its support of the HOO this quarter.”<sup>13</sup>

### **Major Crimes Task Force**

As discussed in Chapter 4.2, the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) is “the principal Afghan government agency responsible for investigating and processing major anti-corruption,

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<sup>9</sup> For example, this chapter does not cover U.S. support to the Afghan Supreme Audit Office.

<sup>10</sup> The 4A project was initially a three-year project ending September 2013; however, it is still listed as a current project. See USAID Afghanistan, Democracy & Governance, Current Projects (accessed January 27, 2014): <http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/democracy-governance>. Prior to this, USAID provided support to the HOO through The Asia Foundation.

<sup>11</sup> Information provided by the U.S. Embassy Interagency Rule of Law (IROL) Office, February 2014. See also USAID Afghanistan Fact Sheet: Assistance for Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Authority (4A), December 2012: <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/Fact%20Sheet%204A%20Project%20-%20Dec%202012%20-%20FINAL.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress, January 30, 2014 (hereinafter SIGAR January 2014), p. 11: <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014Jan30QR.pdf>.

kidnapping, and organized crime cases.”<sup>14</sup> In June 2012, the MCTF comprised a total of 212 Afghan personnel - 150 from the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and 62 from the National Directorate of Security (NDS).<sup>15</sup>

U.S. support to the MCTF ranges from operation and maintenance support for the MCTF facility to mentoring and training MCTF investigators.<sup>16</sup> Current funding for the MCTF was not available at the time of this writing, however, through fiscal year 2010 the U.S. obligated US\$17.1 million in assistance to the MCTF, and funding for fiscal year 2011 was expected to be around \$24 million.<sup>17</sup> Funding for equipment for MCTF has been provided primarily out of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund managed by the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).<sup>18</sup> Funding for the operations and maintenance and life support for the MCTF facility has been provided primarily out of Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding.<sup>19</sup> Afghanistan Security Forces Funds must be used in support of Afghan security forces, which includes the MOI portion of the MCTF.<sup>20</sup> DOD funding does not support NDS personnel assigned to the MCTF.<sup>21</sup> Indirect support for the MCTF has also been provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).<sup>22</sup>

DOD signed interagency agreements with the FBI and INL to provide goods and services to support the MCTF.<sup>23</sup> INL oversees the operation and maintenance of the MCTF facilities including housing, life support, and security for MCTF personnel and international advisors.<sup>24</sup> As the lead agency for mentoring and training MCTF investigators, the FBI developed a five-year strategic plan (2009-2014).<sup>25</sup> In February 2013, FBI mentors “disengaged from the MCTF and were succeeded by personnel from the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Afghanistan (CJIATF-A).”<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force, July 19, 2011, p. 1:

<http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-11-12.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Information provided by the U.S. Embassy Kabul, June 2012. This is an increase from November 2011 when it was reported that the MCTF personnel totaled 163 – 100 from MOI and 63 from NDS. See *ibid*, p. 4.

<sup>16</sup> SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force, *supra* note 14, p. 3.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*. Funding disbursements as of September 30, 2010 totaled US\$15.5 million. See *ibid*, p. 4. The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) also provides funding to the MCTF.

<sup>18</sup> As of September 30, 2010, funding in support of the MCTF included DOD funding of US\$10.4 million. *Ibid*, p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> Information provided by the U.S. Embassy Kabul, June 2012.

<sup>20</sup> SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force, *supra* note 14, p. 2, ftnt. 1.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>22</sup> As of September 30, 2010, funding in support of the MCTF included FBI funding of US\$4.5 million and DEA funding of US\$0.5 million. *Ibid*, p. 4.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2.

<sup>24</sup> Implementation is currently through a contract with DynCorp International. *Ibid*, p. 3

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 3 & 4.

<sup>26</sup> SIGAR January 2014, *supra* note 13, p. 137.

Veteran law enforcement officers from other U.S. agencies including the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division, as well as the U.S. Department of Treasury have also supported the MCTF.<sup>27</sup> Other countries including Great Britain, France, Canada, and Australia have also provided mentors to the MCTF.<sup>28</sup> As of May 2012, approximately 40 international mentors supported the MCTF.<sup>29</sup> MCTF mentors do not actively participate in investigations.<sup>30</sup> Their role is strictly to train and mentor the Afghans.<sup>31</sup> Pursuant to the FBI five-year strategic plan for the MCTF, mentors provide training on basic and specialized investigative skills including:<sup>32</sup>

<b>Basic objectives</b>	<b>Specialized objectives</b>
Interview and interrogation Basic investigator training Source development Law enforcement safety and survival <i>Case Building</i>	Kidnapping investigations Transnational organized crime Public corruption Law enforcement executive development seminar <i>Tactical room clearing and arrest planning</i> <i>Financial crimes investigation</i> <i>Covert surveillance techniques</i> <i>GPS/land navigation</i> <i>Advanced tactical firearms</i> <i>Crime scene and evidence collection</i>
Source: FBI 5-year plan for the MCTF.	

It should be noted that the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), although primarily focused on high-level drug related criminal cases, assists the MCTF with the investigation of high-level corruption cases.<sup>33</sup> The SIU, which is run by the Afghan police, is supported by the DEA with funding from the State Department and DOD.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>27</sup> SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force, *supra* note 14. See also FBI, Mission Afghanistan Part 2: The Major Crimes Task Force, April 22, 2011: [http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/april/afghanistan\\_042211](http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/april/afghanistan_042211); International Operations, Mission Afghanistan: [http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/international\\_operations](http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/international_operations).

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* Statistics as of May 2012.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force, *supra* note 14, p. 5. Italicized portion provided by the U.S. Embassy Kabul, June 2012. From February 2010 to May 2012, MCTF personnel attended 63 courses provided by the MCTF mentors. Information provided by the U.S. Embassy Kabul, June 2012

<sup>33</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul, About Us, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration: <http://kabul.usembassy.gov/dea.html>. The SIU was the investigative body in the Mohammad Zia Salehi corruption case. See CRS Report, *supra* note 1, p. 12.

<sup>34</sup> CRS Report, *supra* note 1, p. 33.

## Anti-Corruption Unit of the Attorney General's Office

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Senior Legal Advisor's Office assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul train and mentor key Afghan judicial officials.<sup>35</sup> DOJ Attorneys currently focus on counter-narcotics, national security crimes and, to a limited extent, public corruption crimes.<sup>36</sup>

Prior to October 2011, DOJ Attorneys along with Justice Advisors from INL's Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) worked on a regular basis with the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) prosecutors and staff to improve their capacity to develop investigations and prosecute cases of official corruption. As mentioned in Chapter 4.2, in July 2010, the Attorney General prohibited the use of polygraph examinations as part of the vetting process for prosecutors and subsequently hired 50 prosecutors for the ACU.<sup>37</sup> Obvious concern was raised regarding the selection process for ACU prosecutors because they were "no longer subject to polygraph examination, and no meaningful background checks [or] periodic re-investigations are occurring."<sup>38</sup> That same month, the Attorney General terminated all mentoring activity.<sup>39</sup> DOJ Attorneys returned to the ACU in December 2010, but their mentoring activities were restricted to older, low-level cases.<sup>40</sup> In May/June of 2011, DOJ Attorneys were ostensibly allowed to mentor ACU prosecutors on more significant cases, but because the case management system was not being utilized DOJ Attorneys were "unable to determine which cases were new and which were being pursued as of June 30, 2011."<sup>41</sup> All U.S. supported mentoring/training of the ACU was suspended in October 2011 because of the "pervasive culture of corruption."<sup>42</sup> In June 2012, at the request of the Afghan Government, DOJ Attorneys began providing limited advisory assistance to the ACU.<sup>43</sup> In January 2014, SIGAR reported the ACU "has seen a decrease in INL and Department of Justice (DOJ) engagement due to reduced interest by the ACU. Although the ACU has demonstrated capacity to prosecute minor corruption cases, it remains ineffective against higher-level corruption. State INL assesses this as being almost entirely due to a lack of will."<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Funding is provided through an inter-agency agreement between INL and DOJ.

<sup>36</sup> Information provided by DOJ, May 2012 and INL/AP, July 2012.

<sup>37</sup> SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2011 (hereinafter SIGAR January 2011), p. 109: <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Jan2011/HiRes/AntiCorruption.pdf>

<sup>38</sup> SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30, 2011 (hereinafter SIGAR July 2011), p. 92: <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Jul2011/LoresPDF/Governance.pdf>

<sup>39</sup> SIGAR January 2011, *supra* note 37, p. 109.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 92-93

<sup>41</sup> SIGAR July 2011, *supra* note 38, p. 93.

<sup>42</sup> SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2011, p. 95: <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/oct2011/Lores/Governance.pdf>.

<sup>43</sup> Information provided by INL/AP July 2012.

<sup>44</sup> SIGAR January 2014, *supra* note 13, p. 137. DOJ continues to mentor judges and prosecutors at the Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), which investigates and prosecutes major narcotics cases, including narcotics-related corruption cases. See Volume 5 for information on counter narcotics.

In response to international pressure to prosecute corruption cases the Afghanistan Attorney General established the Special Cases Committee (SCC) in January 2012.<sup>45</sup> As described in Chapter 4.2, the SCC is an Afghan-international committee “designed to initiate and monitor the progress of long-stalled, high-profile cases of corruption and organized crime.”<sup>46</sup> The establishment of the SCC was viewed as “the first positive development in prosecuting and investigating major corruption cases since [...] 2010.”<sup>47</sup> The investigation team overseen by the SCC appeared to be making some progress in the National Military Hospital and the Office of the Afghan National Army Surgeon General cases.<sup>48</sup> The SCC had little political support, however, and by June 2013 was “effectively defunct.”<sup>49</sup>

### Anti-Corruption Tribunal

The U.S. supports the Afghan Anti-Corruption Tribunal (ACT) in Kabul in the following manner:

- USAID, through its Formal Rule of Law Stabilization Program (RLS-F), is providing the design and construction of a new ACT courthouse.<sup>50</sup>
- USAID, through RLS-F, is working with the ACT to develop textbooks on anti-corruption law.<sup>51</sup>
- The U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) mentors the Afghan Judicial Security Unit (JSU), which provides courtroom and personal security at the ACT in Kabul.<sup>52</sup>
- INL provides the funding for the operation and maintenance support of the JSU compound as well as housing and life support for the USMS mentors.<sup>53</sup>

In the past USAID RLS-F provided training for ACT judges on requested topics including judicial ethics and case management as well as computer training for ACT judges and staff.<sup>54</sup> USAID has also supplied the court with the Afghanistan Court Administration System (ACAS)

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<sup>45</sup> Department of Defense (DOD) Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2012 (hereinafter DOD Progress Report April 2012), p. 80:

[http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report\\_Final\\_SecDef\\_04\\_27\\_12.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf).

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2012, p. 106:

<http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2012-04-30qr.pdf>

<sup>48</sup> Ibid; see also DOD Progress Report April 2012, *supra* note 45, p. 80-81.

<sup>49</sup> SIGAR Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress, July 30, 2013: <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-07-30qr.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> See USAID Afghanistan Fact Sheet, June 2011. Link available at:

[http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/182/Rule\\_of\\_Law\\_Stabilization\\_Program\\_Formal\\_Component](http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/182/Rule_of_Law_Stabilization_Program_Formal_Component)

<sup>51</sup> USAID Afghanistan, Rule of Law Stabilization – Formal Component, Monthly Report, November 1 – November 31, 2013 (hereinafter USAID RLS-F Nov. 2013 Report), p. 5. PDF link available from “legal education Afghanistan” search on USAID Afghanistan website: <http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan>.

<sup>52</sup> The JSU also provides security at the Supreme Court and the Counter Narcotics Justice Center. See U.S. Marshals Service, Fact Sheets, Special Operations Group: <http://www.justice.gov/marshals/duties/factsheets/tod-1209.html>.

<sup>53</sup> Information provided by INL.

<sup>54</sup> See CRS Report, *supra* note 1, p. 31. Information also provided by USAID RLS-Formal, January 4, 2012.

forms along with some basic material support including heaters, filing cabinets and computers.<sup>55</sup> In addition, DOJ Attorneys were serving as mentors and providing training for judges and prosecutors at the ACT in Kabul.<sup>56</sup> U.S. support, however, has been suspended for the time being due to the lack of cooperation from the new chief judge of the ACT and concerns regarding the integrity of the Tribunal.<sup>57</sup>

## Reporting Corruption

In addition to supporting Afghan anti-corruption efforts, the U.S. government recognizes the need to improve financial oversight and monitoring of donor money. Specific concerns have been raised about the unintended consequences that funds used for contracting can have on U.S. counter-insurgency efforts.<sup>58</sup> The lack of proper contract oversight can have the unintended effect of giving power brokers, criminal networks and insurgents the opportunity to benefit from illicit revenue or stolen property.

The U.S. has developed guidelines for all U.S. Mission personnel in the field for reporting corruption.<sup>59</sup> The primary reporting channel is to the U.S. Embassy Interagency Rule of Law Office.<sup>60</sup> Cases involving malfeasance of U.S. funds for Afghan reconstruction can also be reported directly with SIGAR.<sup>61</sup> Additional efforts by DOD in establishing the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF)-*Shafafiyat* (Transparency) to lead ISAF anti-corruption initiatives, including contracting oversight, are discussed in Chapter 4.4.

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<sup>55</sup> Information provided by USAID RLS-Formal, January 4, 2012; See Chapter 3.3 for a discussion of ACAS.

<sup>56</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul, About Us, U.S. Department of Justice: <http://kabul.usembassy.gov/doj.html>.

<sup>57</sup> Information provided by USAID RLS-Formal, January 4, 2012. See also Chapter 4.2.

<sup>58</sup> See e.g. U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, Revision 1, February 2010, p. 16: [http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ICMCP\\_Feb\\_2011final.pdf](http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ICMCP_Feb_2011final.pdf).

<sup>59</sup> See Field Guidance on Anti-Corruption Efforts previously available on HamonieWeb Afghanistan ROL Worksite: <https://www.harmonieweb.org>. The worksite has since been reportedly moved to All Partners Access Network (APAN), however, at the time of this writing the documents could not be accessed on APAN: <https://community.apan.org/default.aspx>.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> See SIGAR: <http://www.sigar.mil/Default.asp>. Email: [hotline@sigar.mil](mailto:hotline@sigar.mil); Fax: (703) 604-0983; Phone: +1.866.329.8893(toll free international line in the U.S.) or 312.664.0378 (DSN International).

## Resources

- Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (May 2, 2012):  
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<http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/london-conference/#>.
- CRS Report RS41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman (Nov. 9, 2010)(hereinafter CRS Report:  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/152606.pdf>.

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