

4.4: UN, ISAF, and EU Support to Afghanistan Anti-corruption Efforts

Summary

This chapter provides an overview of the anti-corruption programs provided by the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-International Security Assistance Force, and the European Union.

Introduction

The International Community in Afghanistan consists of the United Nations (UN) Country Team, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), donor countries, multilateral and bilateral institutions and agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Chapter 1.4 provides an introduction to the major international organizations involved in rule of law development in Afghanistan and their mandates.¹ Among the international organizations with rule of law programs the United Nations, NATO/ISAF, and the European Union have anti-corruption programs. This chapter provides an overview of their anti-corruption programs emphasizing support to Afghanistan's anti-corruption bodies when applicable. This chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive review of the international community's efforts to combat corruption in Afghanistan.

The United Nations Country Team

The United Nations (UN) Country Team consists of 23 members.² The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have both supported anti-corruption programs.³ “UNODC and UNDP early on agreed on a clear and complementary division of labour with UNODC responsible for supporting capacity building in relation to the role of justice institutions in anticorruption and the role of the High Office [of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO)] in anti-corruption justice and enforcement activities, while UNDP has specialized in capacity building relating to prevention of corruption and administrative measures to detect and punish corruption. UNODC and UNDP

¹ See Chapter 1.4: The International Community and Rule of Law Implementers in Afghanistan.

² See United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Country Team (accessed January 28, 2014): <http://unama.unmissions.org/>. See also, UNAMA FAQs: <http://unama.unmissions.org/>. See Chapter 1.4 for an overview of the UN Country Team members focusing on rule of law issues in Afghanistan.

³ The World Bank provides salary support to a small number of HOO staff through its Management Capacity Program.

have also benefited from the opportunity to partner with UNAMA which, in its political role, supports much needed advocacy.”⁴

The United Nations Development Programme

UNDP implemented the Accountability and Transparency (ACT) Project from January 2007 through March 2012. ACT was a “multi-donor programme that support[ed] the government of Afghanistan in developing the necessary capacities to fight corruption at the national and sub-national levels.”⁵ There were four main components of the ACT Project developed in support of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC):⁶

1. Improved institutional and policy environment created to support the implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy;
2. Enhanced accountability, transparency and integrity in key government institutions.
3. Increased awareness and understanding amongst the public and enhance capacity of civil society and media to effectively contribute to the fight against corruption.
4. Enhanced independent monitoring of anti-corruption efforts undertaken by government and civil society.

In January 2011, the ACT Project was revised to more specifically define its activities to include:⁷

1. building the capacity development of the HOO;
2. strengthening the internal integrity mechanisms in the Supreme Audit Office (SAO), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Education (MOE); and the Ministry of Interior (MOI);

⁴ UNODC, Concept Note: Anti-Corruption Measures in Afghanistan, Time Frame: January 2010-December 2012: http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//conceptnotes/Microsoft_Word_-_2010_11_April_01_Concept_Note_Anti-Corruption.pdf

⁵ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan, Accountability and Transparency Project (ACT) 2007-2012 Factsheet (May 2011)(hereinafter ACT Factsheet): <http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Report2011/ACT/Project-ACT-May2011.pdf>; see also UNDP Afghanistan, ACT Project, Third Quarter Project Progress Report (July – September 2011)(hereinafter UNDP 3rd Quarter Report): <http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Report2011/ACT/Third%20Quarter%20Progress%20Report%20of%20ACT.pdf>. Donor countries include Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom.

⁶ ACT Factsheet, *supra* note 5; see also Chapter 4.1 for a discussion of UNCAC; Chapter 1.1 for a discussion of the ANDS; and Chapter 4.2 for a discussion of the ANDS’ anti-corruption sector and Afghanistan’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy.

⁷ UNDP 3rd Quarter Report, *supra* note 5, p. 7; See Chapter 4.1 for a description of the Joint Independent Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) and its function; see Chapter 4.1 for an overview of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO).

3. extending the engagement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) by establishing CSO networks to support the complaints process in the ministries and increasing awareness of the role of CSOs in anti-corruption efforts; and
4. supporting the establishment and operations of the Joint Independent Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC).

The ACT Project's support to the HOO involved providing technical capacity and material support including information technology, equipment, rental of office space and vehicles, security upgrades, as well as international and national consultants.⁸ Through a Letter of Agreement, UNDP oversaw the recruitment of HOO staff "in the areas of prevention, strategy and planning, oversight, capacity development, and administration and finance, among others."⁹ The ACT Project ended in March 2012. UNDP's current rule of law programs do not include a specific anti-corruption project.¹⁰

UNDP also supported the establishment of the Joint Independent Anti-Corruption MEC and was the temporary Secretariat for the committee until a permanent Secretariat was established.¹¹ UNDP further established the Inter Institutional Anti-Corruption Coordination (IIACC) Meeting, which is "an inter-ministerial coordinating framework comprised of representatives of the MOF, MOE, MOI, [SAO] and HOO that follow up on the implementation of the anti-corruption measures across Afghanistan and improve coordination and cooperation across project components and partners."¹²

⁸ Office of the Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight, December 16, 2009, p. 9: <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR20Audit-10-2.pdf>

⁹ UNDP 3rd Quarter Report, *supra* note 5, p. 7.

¹⁰ See Chapter 1.4 for an overview of UNDP's rule of law programs.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 19. See also UNDP Afghanistan 2011, ACT Project, Second Quarter Project Progress Report (hereinafter UNDP 2nd Quarter Report), p. 6: <http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Report2011/ACT/2011-07-21-%20second%20quarter%20progress%20report%20of%20ACT.pdf>

¹² UNDP 3rd Quarter Report, *supra* note 5, p. 20. The IIACC was originally referred to as the Inter Institutional Working Group (IIWG).

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNODC considers itself the “guardian of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.”¹³ In Afghanistan, anti-corruption is one of UNODC’s main priority areas within its larger Criminal Justice or Sub-Programme 3 of the Country Programme for Afghanistan (2012-2014).¹⁴ UNODC’s anti-corruption efforts include support to the HOO, the Supreme Court, the AGO, as well as providing “legal advice for required reforms, and practical assistance in the implementation of obligation under [UNCAC].”¹⁵ UNODC’s anti-corruption measures to support compliance with UNCAC include:¹⁶

1. Strengthened professional capacity in the HOO training directorate;
2. Research capacity of HOO enhanced for more effective evidence-based policy;
3. National law harmonized with Afghanistan’s obligations under UNCAC;
4. Strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations and the private sector to advocate for anti-corruption enforcement measures; and
5. Support promotion of integrity by justice and law enforcement bodies with a focus on the implementation of Codes of Conduct.

In 2008, UNODC Afghanistan conducted a “gap analysis” of Afghanistan’s national legislation and UNCAC.¹⁷ UNCAC related Afghan laws and Afghan anti-corruption authorities can be searched on TRACK - Tools and Resources for Anti-Corruption Knowledge.¹⁸ TRACK is a web-based portal with a Legal Library consisting of a database of UNCAC related legislation and jurisprudence from over 175 States.¹⁹ “Information in the Legal Library is searchable by country, by article of the Convention and such other criteria as legal systems and levels of human development.”²⁰ UNODC assisted Afghanistan in drafting legislation to align its Criminal

¹³ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims*, January 2010, p. 14: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf>.

¹⁴ See UNODC Afghanistan, *Country Programme Criminal Justice*: <http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/criminal-justice.html>. UNODC’s previous anti-corruption program was entitled “AFG/R86 – Strengthening anti-corruption measures in Afghanistan” and extended from August 2007 to June 2012. The project was supported by Austria, Canada, Japan, Norway, Poland, UNDP, and the U.S. See UNODC Criminal Justice Reform AFG/R86 – Strengthening anti-corruption measures in Afghanistan Factsheet: <http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/Projects/R86.html>.

¹⁵ UNODC Afghanistan, *Country Programme Criminal Justice*: <http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/criminal-justice.html>.

¹⁶ UNODC Afghanistan, *Overview of Sub-Programme 3*: http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//New%20Country%20Programme/CP_SP3.pdf.

¹⁷ *The United Nations Convention against Corruption - A Gap Analysis of National Legislation in Afghanistan* (UNODC UNDP, May 2008).

¹⁸ UNODC Launches TRACK portal and anti-corruption legal library : <http://www.unodc.org/southerncone/en/frontpage/2011/09/02-unodc-launches-track-portal-and-anti-corruption-legal-library.html>

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

Procedure Code, Audit Law, Penal Code, Ministries Special Court Law, and Law on the Structure and Authority of the Attorney General's Office with UNCAC.²¹

In addition to the gap analysis for compliance with UNCAC, UNODC has developed educational material on anti-corruption in general as well as some Afghanistan specific material including:²²

- Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims (UNODC, January 2010)
- Strategies and Tactics for the Advocate Defending Anti-Corruption Cases (UNODC, November 2009)
- Anti-Corruption Training Manual (UNODC, September 2008)
- Strengthening the Capacity of the Afghan Judicial System to Prosecute Corruption - Trainers' Handbook (UNODC, UNICRI, September 2008)
- Compendium of International Legal Instruments on Corruption: Second Edition (UNODC 2005)
- The Global Programme Against Corruption, UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit (UNODC 2004)
- Handbook on Practical Anti-Corruption Measures for Prosecutors and Investigators (UNODC 2004)

UNODC also provides financial and technical support to the HOO.²³ Specifically, UNODC developed HOO's assets registration, complaint registration, and case tracking and oversight programs, as well as the Assessment Department.²⁴ Additional anti-corruption activities include:²⁵

- Mentoring of judicial actors in police-prosecutor cooperation and in handling corruption cases;
- Technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice in implementing the provisions of the law on the HOO, and in enacting the Anti-Administrative Corruption Strategy, which was ratified in June 2008;

²¹ See UNODC Criminal Justice Reform AFG/R86 – Strengthening anti-corruption measures in Afghanistan Factsheet: <http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/Projects/R86.html>.

²² UNODC, "Manuals by Topic," Anti-Corruption: <http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/publications-and-reports/manuals.html>. The UNODC website has URL links to the Compendium of International Legal Instruments on Corruption: Second Edition, UNODC 2005; The Global Programme Against Corruption, UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, UNODC 2004; and the Handbook on Practical Anti-Corruption Measures for Prosecutors and Investigators, UNODC 2004. See also UNODC, Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims, *supra* note 13.

²³ UNODC Anti-Corruption Capacity Building: <http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/anti-corruption.html>.

²⁴ See UNODC Criminal Justice Reform AFG/R86 – Strengthening anti-corruption measures in Afghanistan Factsheet: <http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/Projects/R86.html>.

²⁵ UNODC Anti-Corruption Capacity Building: <http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/anti-corruption.html>.

- Support for the Attorney General's Office (AGO) in the development of a Code of Ethics for prosecutors. UNODC also assists the AGO in conducting a nationwide training programme for prosecutors on the Code of Ethics;
- Assistance to the Ministry of the Interior in its development of a Code of Ethics for the police, and will continue to assist the ministry in conducting training for the Afghan police.

International Security Assistance Force

In August 2010, the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) *Shafafiyat* (Transparency) was established to lead ISAF anti-corruption initiatives and neutralize criminal patronage networks.²⁶ CJIATF-*Shafafiyat* “works with Afghan and coalition law enforcement personnel to identify corrupt activities and coordinate anti-corruption efforts.”²⁷ “It does this by fostering a common understanding of the corruption problem, planning and coordinating ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrating ISAF anticorruption activities with the efforts of key partners.”²⁸ CJIATF-*Shafafiyat*’s Counter-Corruption Strategy 2011-2014 is divided into three phases:²⁹

Phase 1: ISAF led expansion of security, governance, and development. Corruption reduced in security ministries, the judicial sector, and state functions critical to transition. Key Afghan leaders working with ISAF and the international community to neutralize Criminal Patronage Networks.

Phase 2: [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan/Afghan National Security Forces (GIRoA/ANSF)] led expansion of security, governance, and development. Sustained efforts by increasingly capable Afghan anti-corruption institutions, with adequate political support to ensure progress toward transparency and accountability.

Phase 3: Strategic Partnership and Safe Haven Denial. Corruption reduced such that it no longer fatally threatens the Afghan state. Enduring and capable anti-

²⁶ Department of Defense (DOD) Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2011, p. 78 (hereinafter DOD Progress Report April 2011): <http://www.defense.gov/news/1231rpt.pdf>. See Chapter 1.4 for an overview of ISAF’s rule of law engagement in Afghanistan.

²⁷ SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2012 (hereinafter SIGAR April 2012), p. 9: <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2012-04-30qr.pdf>.

²⁸ DOD Progress Report April 2011, *supra* note 26, p. 78.

²⁹ Rule of Law Synchronization Conference, ISAF Counter-Corruption Update, CJIATF-*Shafafiyat*, October 24, 2011, slide 7. Previously available on Harmonieweb’s Afghanistan Rule of Law (ROL) Worksite: <https://www.harmonieweb.org>. The worksite has since been reportedly moved to All Partners Access Network (APAN), however, at the time of this writing the documents could not be accessed on APAN: <https://community.apan.org/default.aspx>.

corruption institutions, with adequate political support, sustain progress towards transparency and accountability under the rule of law.

From the beginning CJIAF-*Shafafiyat* was “responsible for integrating the efforts of three existing task forces engaged in counter-corruption and counter-organized crime activities: Task Force 2010, Task Force Spotlight, and CJIAF-Nexus. Task Force 2010 and Task Force Spotlight have been integral in providing increased coordination and oversight of U.S. and ISAF contracting processes and in ensuring that international resources do not inadvertently strengthen criminal networks or insurgent groups.”³⁰ Task Force Spotlight no longer exists, but Task Force 2010 continues to oversee contracting processes.³¹ “Task Force 2010 was established in July 2010 to track the flow of contracting dollars through the Afghan economy and prevent U.S.-funded contracts from inadvertently enriching power brokers, criminals, and insurgents.”³² The Department of Defense (DOD) describes Task Force 2010’s role as follows:³³

TASK FORCE – 2010

Task Force-2010's mission is to develop greater visibility of the flow of contracting funds within Afghanistan at and below the prime contractor level to better employ contracting in support of [Counter-Insurgency (COIN)] operations. Task Force-2010 fuses, augments, and drives existing efforts to provide the operational commander with actionable information regarding key contracting networks, money flows, and linkages to negative actors within their operating space.

In April 2012, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reported: “Task Force 2010 has reviewed 2,000 contracts, contract modifications, and cooperative agreements to identify connections to criminal networks and insurgent groups. Based on these reviews, the task force has made hundreds of recommendations to commanders to mitigate risk. Task force officials estimate that commanders have saved about \$1.2 billion by implementing these

³⁰ DOD Progress Report Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 89: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/October_2011_Section_1230_Report.pdf.

³¹ Information provided by U.S. Embassy, IROL. “[U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)] established Task Force–Spotlight to investigate the issue of ground supply line pilferage, which has resulted in the loss of military equipment worth millions of dollars. Comprised of representatives from U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, U.S. law enforcement agencies, civilian contractors, and Afghan and Pakistani partners, the Task Force [was] also responsible for developing programs and initiatives to improve private security company accountability and performance, to minimize negative actor influence in support of the ISAF mission, and to facilitate the Afghan Government's capability for self-sustaining security.” DOD Progress Report April 2011, *supra* note 26, p. 78.

³² SIGAR April 2012, *supra* note 27, p. 9.

³³ DOD Progress Report April 2011, *supra* note 26, pp. 78-79.

recommendations.”³⁴ Task Force 2010 also report at that time that since January 2011, it has recovered more than 290,000 stolen military items valued at \$180 million.³⁵

In July 2013, Task Force 2010 “assumed responsibility as the contracting officer representative for the Vendor Vetting Reachback Cell (VVRC) contract. The VVRC is responsible for vetting all non-U.S. contractors bidding for contracts equal to or above \$100,000 in the Afghanistan theater of operations. ... [Task Force] 2010 now serves as the as the central point of contact for past, current, and potential vendor/contractor assessments and ratings.”³⁶

“ISAF is increasingly tailoring its operations to address transnational threats posed by the nexus between the insurgency, the narcotics trade, organized crime, and corruption, which are convergent and mutually reinforcing.”³⁷ CJIAF-Nexus supports law enforcement counter-narcotics operations to combat the narcotics-corruption-insurgent nexus.³⁸ “CJIAF-Nexus specifically targets network functions (e.g., safe havens, movement, communications, and finance), rather than individual narco-traffickers, to disrupt network resiliency.”³⁹ The DOD describes CJIAF-Nexus’ mission as follows:⁴⁰

COMBINED JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE – NEXUS

The mission of CJIAF-Nexus is to identify and analyze the confluence of narcotics, corruption, the insurgency, threat finance, and power brokers in Regional Commands South and Southwest to produce operational data that enables synchronized military, law enforcement, and engagement effects. CJIAF-Nexus' mission focuses on drug-related targets connected to the Taliban and on corrupt Afghan Government officials and power brokers who jeopardize the stability and legitimacy of the Government. CJIAF-Nexus identifies and analyzes the narcotics-insurgency-corruption convergence, and partners with other organizations to produce information to enable synchronized military and law enforcement effects.

³⁴ SIGAR April 2012, *supra* note 27, p. 10.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ SIGAR Quarterly Report to U.S. Congress, October 30, 2013, pp. 138-139:

<http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-10-30qr.pdf>.

³⁷ DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2012 (hereinafter DOD Progress Report April 2012), p. 80: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ DOD Progress Report April 2011, *supra* note 26, pp. 78-79.

In 2013, CJIAF-*Shafafiyat*, CJIAF-Nexus, and Task Force 2010 were realigned and nested under a newly established CJIAF-Afghanistan.⁴¹ “With a reduction in personnel and transition well underway, [CJIAF-*Shafafiyat*’s] focus has shifted away from broad-spectrum counter corruption toward hardening Afghan security ministries against corruption.”⁴² In October 2013, SIGAR reported that “CJIAF-*Shafafiyat* was transferred to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to better support MOI and MOD ministerial development. CJIAF-*Shafafiyat* continues its efforts to shape and influence MOI and MOD ministerial development by focusing on the Inspectors General, [Transparency and Accountability Committees], and in developing processes to monitor corruption. CJIAF[-*Shafafiyat*] relies on mentoring and advisor engagements for influence and is supporting development of a financial levers strategy to affect significant behavior changes by the MOI and MOD.”⁴³

ISAF has issued several anti-corruption guidelines to help reduce and prevent corruption including ISAF Anti-Corruption Guidance,⁴⁴ COMISAF Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance,⁴⁵ and Direction & Guidance for ISAF Contracting Best Practices.⁴⁶

The European Union

The European Union (EU) engages in development assistance in Afghanistan pursuant to several strategic documents and action plans.⁴⁷ The Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-2013, which are still the current governing strategies at the time of this writing, provide “governance” as a primary focal area.⁴⁸ The main goals of the governance focal area are:⁴⁹

⁴¹ See DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p: 144

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Section_1230_Report_July_2013.pdf.

⁴² SIGAR Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress, July 30, 2013, p. 138:

<http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-07-30qr.pdf>.

⁴³ SIGAR October 2013, *supra* note 36, p. 138.

⁴⁴ ISAF Anti-Corruption Guidance, 10 February 2010: <http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/740-external--isaf-anti-corruption-guidance>.

⁴⁵ COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance, 8 Sept 2010:

<http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/COMISAF-Guidance/100908-NUI-COMISAF%27s%20COIN%20GUIDANCE%281%29.pdf>

⁴⁶ SOP814 Direction & Guidance for ISAF Contracting Best Practices, 28 Sept. 2010: https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/contracting/Shared%20Documents/NATO%20Rules%20and%20Procedures/SOP_814.pdf. Additional guidance can be found in other ISAF documents, which are not publically available including the Bi-Strategic Command Procurement Directive 60-70, 22 Dec. 2004; and the SHSPTFIAAQM/FC228/10 ACO Afghan First Policy Instructions, 27 Aug. 2010.

⁴⁷ See Chapter 1.4 for a review of the EU’s strategic framework documents for Afghanistan.

⁴⁸ EU-Afghanistan Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013:

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/documents/eu_afghanistan/csp_afg_07-13_en.pdf; see also Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper and Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-2013 (hereinafter MIP):

1. Improve the functioning of the state through improved governance and reform.
2. Foster the rule of law.
3. Improve stability and security (including border security).
4. Increase revenue collection and improve economic growth through trade, *as well as address corruption in the government*, specifically where this relates to agencies and services dealing with border management and revenue collection.

Every year, the European Commission adopts an Annual Action Programme (AAP) for Afghanistan that sets forth actions/projects in line with the Multiannual Indicative Programme. The objectives pursued by the [2013] Annual Action Programme are to support the government of Afghanistan to (i) hold credible and transparent elections (2014 and 2015); (ii) to strengthen local development and governance towards sustainable social and economic development of rural communities and (iii) improve regional cooperation by fostering economic and political relations with the countries in the region.”⁵⁰ The 2013 AAP does not support a specific anti-corruption project.⁵¹

European Union Police Mission (EUPOL)

EUPOL has identified developing Afghan anti-corruption capacities as one of its strategic objectives.⁵² Anti-Corruption support is managed through EUPOL’s Rule of Law Component.⁵³ EUPOL “aims to contribute to effective, credible and sustainable anti-corruption detection and investigative capabilities within the Ministry of Interior and the Attorney General’s Office. In particular, it aims to enhance the relationship between MOI anti-corruption investigators and the AGO’s anti-corruption prosecutors, and to achieve a year on year increase on the number of police corruption cases that are forwarded to the AGO for consideration of court proceedings. EUPOL [..] trains and mentors the Anti-Corruption Units which were established at the MOI and the AGO, monitoring their work, case management system and the overall progress in the fight against corruption.”⁵⁴ EUPOL’s mission is currently set to end December 31, 2014.⁵⁵

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/documents/content/multiannual_indicative_programme_2011_13_en.pdf.

⁴⁹ MIP, *ibid*, p. 22 (emphasis added).

⁵⁰ Commission Implementing Decision of 21/11/2013 on the Annual Action Programme 2013 in favour of Afghanistan to be financed from the general budget of the European Union, p. 2: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2013/aap_2013_afg_en.pdf.

⁵¹ The 2011 AAP supported the National Priority Programs for Law and Justice for All and the NPP on Efficient and Effective Governance. The 2011 APP also specifically approved support to the Afghan National Police through the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA). See European Commission Implementing Decision of 30.11.2011 on the Annual Action Programme 2011 in favour of Afghanistan to be financed under Article 19 10 01 02 of the general budget of the European Union, Brussels, 30.11.2011, C(2011) 8773 final: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2011/aap_2011_afg_en.pdf.

⁵² European Police Mission (EUPOL) Afghanistan, About Us (accessed January 29, 2014): <http://81.17.241.206/?q=node/4>. See Chapter 1.4 for an overview of EUPOL’s rule of law programs.

⁵³ See EUPOL Afghanistan, Rule of Law Component (accessed January 29, 2014): <http://81.17.241.206/?q=node/9>.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

Resources

- United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Support of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2010-2013:
<http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?link=Publication%2fUNDAF+English.pdf&tabid=1763&mid=2026>
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan, Accountability and Transparency Project (ACT) 2007-2012 Factsheet (May 2011):
<http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Report2011/ACT/Project-ACT-May2011.pdf>.
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<http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Report2011/ACT/Third%20Quarter%20Progress%20Report%20of%20ACT.pdf>.
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<http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Report2011/ACT/2011-07-21-%20second%20quarter%20progress%20report%20of%20ACT.pdf>
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<http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR20Audit-10-2.pdf>
- Office of the Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2012:
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- SIGAR Quarterly Report to U.S. Congress, October 30, 2013:
<http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-10-30qr.pdf>.

⁵⁵ In May 2012, the Council extended EUPOL's mission until 31 December 2014: COUNCIL DECISION 2013/240/CFSP of 27 May 2013, amending Decision 2010/279/CFSP on the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan): http://www.eupol-afg.eu/sites/default/files/Council_decision.pdf.

- Department of Defense (DOD) Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2011: <http://www.defense.gov/news/1231rpt.pdf>.
- DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2012: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf.
- DOD Progress Report Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/October_2011_Section_1230_Report.pdf.
- DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Section_1230_Report_July_2013.pdf.
- Rule of Law Synchronization Conference, ISAF Counter-Corruption Update, CJIAF-*Shafafiyat*, October 24, 2011. Previously available on Harmonieweb's Afghanistan Rule of Law (ROL) Worksite: <https://www.harmonieweb.org>. The worksite has since been reportedly moved to All Partners Access Network (APAN), however, at the time of this writing the documents could not be accessed on APAN: <https://community.apan.org/default.aspx>.
- European Union-Afghanistan Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/documents/eu_afghanistan/csp_afg_07-13_en.pdf.
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