

8.3: The Organization and Structure of the Afghan National Police

Summary

This chapter provides an overview of the organization and structure of the Afghan National Police along with a description of the main department's responsibilities.

Introduction

The Afghan National Police (ANP) fall under the organization and leadership of the Ministry of Interior (MOI). As of September 2013, the ANP totaled 152,336 personnel with an end-strength goal of 157,000.¹ Historically, the ANP has been described as four main pillars, two auxiliary pillars, and enabling forces as indicated in the chart below.² The current National Police Plan (NPP), however, does not distinguish between the main pillars and the auxiliary pillars, but rather combines them under one title - "Pillars of the ANP."³ In addition, the NPP recognizes the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and the Prison Police as separate ANP pillars.⁴ Unlike the National Police Strategy (NPS), the NPP does not define the ANP pillars. Accordingly, this chapter provides an overview of the roles and functions of each of the main police pillars and the two auxiliary pillars based on the Police Law and the NPS. The CNPA, therefore, falls under the Anti-Crime Police pillar.⁵ The Prison Police do not have a separate designation anywhere in the NPS and are not covered in this chapter, but are discussed in Volume 7, which covers Afghanistan's correctional system.

¹ U.S. Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013 (hereinafter DOD Progress Report NOV 2013), pp. 59 & 61:

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.

² See Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOI), Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy Department of Strategy, Afghan National Police Strategy 1389 (December 2010)(hereinafter National Police Strategy), p. 23: <http://ipcb.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/nps-final-version.pdf>; see also National Police Plan for Solar Years (SY) 1390-1391 (2011), Translation provided by the MICC, 5 Apr 11, POC: Wg Cdr M Bland, p. 13: <http://ipcb.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/npp-12-21-dual-column-english-dari.pdf>.

³ Afghan National Police Plan Solar Years (SY) 1392-1393, March 2013, (hereinafter National Police Plan), provided by Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Ministry of Interior Ministerial Advisory Group (MOI-MAG), p. 7.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Although this chapter provides some information on the CNPA, a full discussion of the force is provided in Volume 5, which covers counternarcotics in Afghanistan.

Afghan National Police

MAIN POLICE PILLARS	AUXILIARY PILLARS	ENABLING FORCES
AFGHAN UNIFORM POLICE (AUP)	AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE (APPF)	MEDICAL
AFGHAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE (ANCOP)	AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE (ALP)	LOGISTICAL
AFGHAN BORDER POLICE (ABP)		ADMINISTRATIVE
AFGHAN ANTI-CRIME POLICE (AACP)		RECRUITMENT
		TRAINING AND EDUCATION
		HEADQUARTERS

Afghan Uniform Police

The Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) department is the largest police component with approximately 85,000 personnel.⁶ The AUP are primarily assigned to police stations at the provincial and district level and check points across the country.⁷ Each province (34) has a police headquarters and each district (364) has a police station largely manned by the AUP. The AUP are generally the first responders to a scene.⁸ Because they are the largest police component and visible throughout the country, the AUP are considered “the face of the government to the Afghan people.”⁹ The AUP have suffered the most casualties in the war with twice as many police dying as soldiers.¹⁰

The AUP are responsible for the core functions of policing “including maintaining public order, crime and traffic control, and fire, rescue, and emergency response.”¹¹ As part of the long term vision to transition the AUP to a civilian policing unit, the National Police Strategy sets forth the specific roles, duties, and responsibilities of the AUP as follows:¹²

1. Focus on the core functions of policing and providing public services, training and education, as well as equipping this force in order to prevent and detect crime, assure public safety, maintain civil order, protect property and safely control traffic.
2. Maintain the rule of law, adopting an intelligence-led policing model.

⁶ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 64. The MOI reported in 2012 that the AUP comprised 73% of the ANP - 108,391 out of roughly 149,000. See MOI, Uniformed Police (accessed November 6, 2013): <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/9887>. In February 2013, the United Institute of Peace (USIP) reported a total of 90,500 members of the AUP. See USIP Special Report 322, *Police Transition in Afghanistan*, by Donald J. Planty and Robert M. Perito, February 2013 (hereinafter USIP Police Transition in Afghanistan), p. 4:

<http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR322.pdf>.

⁷ MOI, Uniformed Police (accessed November 6, 2013): <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/9887>.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ USIP Police Transition in Afghanistan, *supra* note 6, p. 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4; see also National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 25.

¹² National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 24.

3. Respond to emergencies and maintain public safety.
4. With the support of the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP), prevent, promptly detect and investigate minor crime.
5. Secure and preserve evidence, gather and process criminal intelligence.
6. Identify and protect witnesses and victims.
7. Arrest and detain suspects and perpetrators.
8. Build public confidence in the [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan].
9. Gather intelligence to support counter insurgency operations.
10. Carry out other general policing duties.
11. Provide fire suppression, prevention and rescue.¹³
12. Ensure safety on the roads, prevent and investigate traffic accidents.
13. Maintain orderly traffic flow, organize traffic affairs and inspect vehicles for safety.
14. Provide public traffic courses to educate drivers on traffic control, traffic rules, and traffic signs and issue driver's licenses and vehicle registrations.
15. Ensure enforcement of appropriate domestic violence legislation in order to promote familial and community stability in accordance with enlightened Islamic and Afghan family values.
16. Assure adequate security for candidates during elections. Perform according to Independent Election Commission standards and remain impartial during the election process.

The Government of Afghanistan and the International Security Forces Afghanistan (ISAF) made the deliberate decision to focus on force-generation and support to the counter insurgency (COIN) campaign to be followed by the professionalization of the ranks and development of enabling forces.¹⁴ As a result, the ANP's major challenge is the professionalization of the force. Recruits are supposed to attend an eight week basic police training course. Some recruits, however, are fielded directly into units without training.¹⁵ In December 2012, "roughly 17,552 (20 percent) of the AUP [were] untrained and approximately 12,800 (15 percent) [were] unvetted."¹⁶ Almost a year later the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) reported that "[w]ith more than 19,000 untrained patrolmen within the fielded force of 152,000, the ANP has lower quality

¹³ In 2013, the MOI established the Afghan National Fire – Disaster Response and Emergency Services (ANF-DRES) department. The ANF-DRES is "a very immature organization, but with great potential for rapid progress." See U.S. Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013 (hereinafter DOD Progress Report July 2013), p. 87: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Section_1230_Report_July_2013.pdf.

¹⁴ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1 p. 33.

¹⁵ See U.S. Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012 (hereinafter DOD Progress Report DEC 2012), pp. 73-74: http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_Report_final.pdf.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 73.

patrolmen and less professional units.”¹⁷ The AUP’s “major capability shortfalls” are reported as:¹⁸

[Medical evacuation] and [casualty evacuation], literacy, logistics, coordination and execution of joint operations, effective [command and control] structure and guidance from MOI, professional development and merit-based promotions, and evidence-based operations training and execution. Of these, progress is most evident in literacy development.

The command and control structure of the AUP is transitioning. Under Article 4 of the Police Law, appointed provincial governors and district governors have an operational relationship over the police:¹⁹

Police Law, Article Four:

- (1) The police shall perform their duties under the leadership of the Minister of Interior in the capital, as well [as] under the affect [sic] of the respective governor and sub-governor in the provinces and districts.
- (2) Police perform their duties according to this law and follow their organizational chain of command;
- (3) The border police perform their duties under the leadership of the Minister of Interior in understanding with respective governor and sub-governor both in the capital and provinces.

“The governors don’t actually command the police but rather delegate this authority. The AUP are assigned to police districts under an appointed District Chief of Police (DCoP) who is subordinate to the District Governor. All of the districts within a province are controlled by an appointed Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) who is subordinate to the Provincial Governor.”²⁰ In addition to the governors, “Zone Commanders” were appointed to correspond with the Regional Commands established by ISAF.²¹ Each zone was responsible for several provinces.

¹⁷ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 61.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 65.

¹⁹ Police Law, Official Gazette No. 994, August 27, 2009, translated by NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/CSTC-A, Wasseel Ahmad Jamal Esq., Naikan Afghan Logistic/Service Company (hereinafter Police Law), Art. 4. Provincial Governors are political appointees. District Governors historically were appointed by the President. In March 2010, pursuant to a Presidential Decree, the District Governor position was converted to a civil servant position, but not all of the positions have been converted. See Preface Chapter, Subnational Governance for more information on provincial and district governors.

²⁰ International Security Assistance Forces Afghanistan (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC) Information Dominance Center (IDC) Information Paper: Police in Afghanistan, November 2011, p. 6: <http://info.publicintelligence.net/ISAF-AfghanPolice.pdf>.

²¹ *Ibid*.

Under paragraph two of Article four of the Police Law, it was inferred that Zone Commanders were given authority over the AUP in their area of operation.²² In March 2013, the MOI decided to disband the AUP zone headquarters command structure.²³ The command and control structure is now organized into regional commands under “Type A” Provincial Chief of Police.²⁴ “Type A, B, and C [Provincial Chief of Police] are the senior police officers in Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The Type A [Provincial Chief of Police] is responsible for all policing within an assigned region, normally encompassing several provinces of Afghanistan. Within their region, responsibilities are further sub-divided, according to population, by Type B or C [headquarters] to assist and facilitate the policing for that sub-divided region.”²⁵ It is believed that disbanding the zone command structure “will create an ANP command structure that is less reflective of the [Afghan National Army] structure [and] more in line with the structure of most non-wartime police forces.”²⁶ There “remains a great deal of confusion related to the implementation of this new [headquarter] structure”²⁷ and the “full implementation and consequences of this decision” have yet to be seen.²⁸

Afghan National Civil Order Police

The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) is “an elite constabulary unit created to deal with civil disorder by bridging the gap between the AUP and the Afghan military.”²⁹ ANCOP members are stationed in five brigades located in Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, and Paktia.³⁰ “With approximately 15,000 personnel, the ANCOP are a regionally-based, nationally-deployable police pillar whose primary role is to maintain the rule of law and order utilizing armed capability. They are capable of rapid deployment in support of their own missions or the missions of other [Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)] units.”³¹

ANCOP was conceived as an emergency reaction force to control civil disorder. ANCOP’s initial assignment, however, was to replace the district-level AUP personnel who were attending Focused District Development (FDD) training at the Regional Training Centers.³² FDD “was aimed at enhancing AUP capabilities by vetting, training, and reequipping all uniformed police

²² Ibid.

²³ DOD Progress Report July 2013, *supra* note 13, p. 86.

²⁴ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 60.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ DOD Progress Report July 2013, *supra* note 13, p. 79.

²⁷ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 60.

²⁸ DOD Progress Report July 2013, *supra* note 13, p. 79.

²⁹ USIP Police Transition in Afghanistan, *supra* note 6, p. 4; *see also*, MOI, Brief Description on Directorate of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) (accessed November 6, 2013): <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/1987>; DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 58.

³⁰ MOI, Brief Description on Directorate of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) (accessed November 6, 2013): <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/1987>.

³¹ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 63; *see also* National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 26.

³² The U.S. military (CSTC-A) began the Federal District Development (FDD) program in November 2007. *See* Chapter 8.5: International Support to the Afghan National Police.

in a single district at one time as a unit.”³³ ANCOP serves as the police force for the district during the two-month FDD training period. ANCOP’s role was subsequently envisioned to “serve as the lead element in the consolidation phase of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations after the military had secured an area.”³⁴ ANCOP’s specific roles, duties, and responsibilities include:³⁵

1. Provide intelligence information and tactical support to the ANA during the ‘shape’ and ‘clear’ phases and be the lead police organization in the ‘hold’ phase of counter-insurgency operations and work in partnership with the ANA and ABP during framework operations.
2. Replace and/or support the [AUP] in high-threat and unstable areas, during Focused District Development, or when required for augmentation purposes.
3. Maintain and restore civil order.
4. Conduct public order operations during sensitive or dangerous civil disturbances and riots.
5. Conduct operations that require a higher level of training and tactics or require a mobile quick reaction force for direct action such as hostage rescues and counter terrorism operations.
6. Support counter narcotics operations and assist in poppy eradication when required.

ANCOP recruits receive 16-weeks of specialized training including primary and advanced education, driver’s education, emergency medical care, demining, communications, and computers.³⁶ According to the DOD, ANCOP is “the most capable pillar within the MOI” and “has consistently proven to be a viable and effective force during deployed operations.”³⁷

[T]he most significant area of concern for ANCOP is the incorrect utilization of their forces, which stretches resources and limits the mission performance of ANCOP units. Due to political influences, ANCOP conducts missions which should be conducted by other ANSF units or are deployed to locations where their capability is not needed. ... In others, the assignments are completely outside of from [sic] ANCOP key tasks; these include guarding Parliament and banks. Current requirements also result in the deployment of the ANCOP Special Support *kandaks* for combat missions, which removes medical, engineering and transport capabilities from the owning brigade. There are insufficient personnel

³³ USIP Special Report 307, *Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police Victim of Its Own Success*, by Robert M. Perito, May 2012, p. 2: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR307.pdf>.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 6. See Chapter 8.4: The Role of the Afghan National Police in Counter-Insurgency Operations.

³⁵ National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 26; see also MOI, Brief Description on Directorate of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) (accessed November 6, 2013): <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/1987>.

³⁶ MOI, Brief Description on Directorate of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) (accessed November 6, 2013): <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/1987>.

³⁷ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 63.

remaining to act as a reserve *kandak* for quick-reaction forces or a civil unrest response force. The ANCOP also face challenges in coordination and joint operations with the ANA and [National Directorate of Security].³⁸

Afghan Border Police

The Afghan Border Police (ABP) “consists of 23,000 patrolmen, [non-commissioned officers] and officers. It is organized into six zones and one regional command in Kabul. The ABP is responsible for the security of the Afghan border, collection of fees and duties on imports and exports, and control of all of the entry control points into and out of Afghanistan. This includes border crossings, railroad entry points, and airports. They are also responsible for protecting the interior of Afghanistan up to 50 kilometers (km) from the border [referred to as the Border Security Zone].”³⁹ The specific roles, duties, and responsibilities of the ABP are described in the National Police Strategy as follows:⁴⁰

1. Safeguard national boundaries against external aggressions.
2. Control the entry and exit of individuals and vehicles at borders and international airports. Ensure personnel have correct documentation.
3. Deter and counter insurgency and criminal activities within the Border Security Zone.
4. Take immediate action against incursions at the border.
5. Ensure the security of international airports and border crossing points.
6. Prevent all types of smuggling (weapons, ammunition, goods, drugs, historical artifacts, human trafficking, etc.)
7. Control the entry and exit of refugees and immigrants.
8. Cooperate with neighboring countries’ police in accordance with agreed treaties.

“As a police force the ABP is struggling, but improving.”⁴¹ The ABP’s major challenges continue to be illiteracy, corruption and patronage networks, as well as communication, coordination, and cooperation with the ANA.⁴² “ABP training is currently not as extensive as the training most other ANP receive. Training shortfalls include communications, driving, maintenance, counter-IED, computers and literacy.”⁴³ In addition, the ABP’s location in remote and difficult terrain impacts the ability to field personnel and keep them supplied with even basic

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 63.

⁴⁰ National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, pp. 27-28.

⁴¹ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 63.

⁴² See DOD Progress Report DEC 2012, *supra* note 15, pp. 72-73; DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, pp. 63-64.

⁴³ DOD Progress Report DEC 2012, *supra* note 15, pp. 72-73.

needs including water and fuel.⁴⁴ “Logistically, the ABP struggles to identify and fill supply gaps before they become a problem, but once they become a problem ABP still lags in fixing them.”⁴⁵

Afghan Anti-Crime Police

The Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) is “a multifaceted organization that includes the investigative and intelligence capacities of the ANP nationwide and at all levels, from the MOI to district police stations.”⁴⁶ The department is small – numbering 3,400 in February 2013 – and consists of several branches with specialized responsibilities and tasks including:⁴⁷

- Counter terrorism;
- Counter narcotics;
- Police Intelligence;
- Criminal Investigation;
- Major Crimes Task Force;
- General Directorate of Police Special Units; and
- Forensics.

“The mission of the AACP is to provide police units with technical police skills not possessed by other members of the police.”⁴⁸ The roles and mission of the AACP branches are described in the National Police Strategy.⁴⁹

Counter Terrorism⁵⁰

The **Counter Terrorism** branch conducts criminal investigations relating to domestic and international terrorism, especially those involving the Taliban, Al Qaida, extremist groups, illegal armed groups and other external groups interfering with Afghanistan’s internal affairs. It is also tasked with managing the Disposal of Illegally Armed Groups program; and oversight or the disbandment of private security companies.

The Counter-Terrorism Department “appears to have a robust source network but does not work with other elements active in the [counter terrorism] fight such as the General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) or the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC).”⁵¹

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 72.

⁴⁵ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1 , pp. 64.

⁴⁶ USIP Police in Transition, *supra* note 6, p. 4; *see also* National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 28.

⁴⁷ National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 28; *see also* USIP Police in Transition, *supra* note 6, p. 4

⁴⁸ National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 28.

⁴⁹ See *ibid*, pp. 28-32.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 28-29.

⁵¹ DOD Progress Report DEC 2012, *supra* note 15, p. 82.

For more information on the process of a national security case, see Chapter 6.1: National Security Cases in Afghanistan.

Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan⁵²

The **Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)** is responsible for collecting intelligence and investigating punishable activities related to the cultivation, smuggling and illegal production of drugs. It also conducts active detection, eradication operations, and interdiction of the flow of narcotics. In addition, arrests of drug traffickers and seizures of illicit drugs by any agency are referred to the CNPA for prosecution.

The CNPA is discussed in Chapter 5.2: Afghanistan's Counternarcotics Institutions, Agencies and Activities within the Criminal Justice Sector.

Police Intelligence⁵³

The Department of **Police Intelligence** plans and directs intelligence collection activities, performs intelligence threat analysis, creates intelligence products, performs target surveillance, conducts counter-intelligence operations and security investigations. Police intelligence also includes collecting information about ANP personnel and administrative organizations who could be involved in corruption, collusion with enemies and criminals, supervision and control of ANP behavior to ensure it complies with the law of the land and to interdict any activities against the national interest. It is also responsible for MOI security programs. Development of intelligence systems, establishment of closer and better relations with the people and responding to their legitimate and lawful demands will increase the capability of the police. Joint counter insurgency operations conducted with other Afghan security organizations and the ANA will be more successful in achieving our objectives when our intelligence systems are enhanced with information provided by the local community. This will further encourage the people to help and support the police in their fight against insurgents, narcotics trafficking and other criminal behavior. The process of Intelligence Led Policing must be implemented within the MOI. The ANP has access to a vast quantity of information which must be processed to enable the authorities to more efficiently utilize resources. This will transform the ANP from a reactive organization to a proactive one by the following actions.

- a. Develop and diversify the sources of intelligence in order to assess and anticipate the threat, and to insure that proper plans, programs, training and resources are provided commensurate with enemy capabilities.

⁵² National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 29.

⁵³ *Ibid*, pp. 29-30.

b. Implement a process of intelligence gathering, reporting, storing and dissemination within the entire ANP and in coordination with ANA, the National Directorate for Security (NDS) and other international supporting organizations.

c. Develop a proper chain of command, control and communication throughout the ANP. Special focus must be on enhancing police capacity to respond to unforeseen incidents and terrorist attacks. The ultimate goal will be to enable ANP leadership to use the chain of command, delegate responsibility, issue orders, communicate directives and implement both strategic and operational planning.

All intelligence based operations will be planned carefully and strive diligently to reduce unintended civilian casualties, property damage and protect the rights of all Afghans under the Constitution.

Criminal Investigation and Forensics⁵⁴

The **Criminal Investigation** branch conducts special investigations in fields which require professional expertise such as economic crime (computer crime, illegal investments, contract fraud, bribery, forgery, embezzlement, tax and customs fraud), smuggling (of goods or human trafficking), high level crimes against persons (complex homicides, sex crimes, etc.) or property, juvenile crime, child related crime and ethical crime.

According to the DOD, the “ACCP Criminal Investigation Department houses the forensics capability for the Ministry of Interior and the biometrics database for the country.”⁵⁵ The **Forensics** branch “provides criminal investigations units with forensics expertise and support including police laboratories, evidence collection and crime scene management.”⁵⁶

Major Crimes Task Force⁵⁷

The **Major Crimes Task Force** conducts highly sensitive investigations into crimes, especially kidnapping and corruption cases which may have an impact on the State due to the victim’s or the suspect’s identity (high profile officials, their relatives or foreigners). It also investigates organized crimes which may destabilize the country. This includes various fields of investigation such as forgery or weapons trafficking.

The Polygraph system will continue to be used, particularly with regard to those police personnel involved with public assets and those accused of corruption.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 31.

⁵⁵ DOD Progress Report DEC 2012, *supra* note 15, p. 82.

⁵⁶ National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 31.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

The Major Crimes Task Force is discussed in Chapter 4.2: Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Policy and Legal Framework Instruments and Agencies.

The General Directorate of Police Special Unit⁵⁸

The **General Directorate of Police Special Unit (GDPSU)** provide specialist tactical capability to support counter insurgent, counter narcotics and counter organized crime activities. This includes the provision of a Crisis Response Unit, Intelligence and Surveillance capabilities, VIP security and judicial security.

The “GDPSU consists of a two-star national [headquarters] and the following units: three National Mission Units (NMUs), including the Crisis Response Unit (CRU) 222, the Commando Force (CF) 333, and the Afghan Territorial Force (ATF) 444; 19 Provincial Response Companies (PRCs); the Investigative Surveillance Unit (ISU); and two training centers, the Special Police Training Center (SPTC) in Wardak and the Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) in Logar.”⁵⁹ In November 2013, the DOD reported that the PRCs and NMUs “are the most capable units in the MOI, and are among the best units across the entirety of ANSF.”⁶⁰ The Nested Afghan Special Police Strategy describes some of the GDPSU unit capabilities as follows:⁶¹

Crisis Response Unit (CRU) is a national level Police counter-terrorism (CT) force. It is principally tasked for tactical response and high-risk arrests against criminal, terrorist and insurgent suspects in Kabul city and the adjacent provinces. It will be required to have capability to conduct full-spectrum opposed action once at full mission capability. The CRU is normally tasked by [Deputy Minister] Security or requested through the Commander General Director Police Special Units (GDPSU) by the Zone 101 Commander and coordinated by the MOI National Police Coordination Center (NPCC) or directly by MOI HQ.

Commando Force 333 (CF 333) is a counter-insurgency police commando force based in Logar Province but available for and capable of high-risk nationwide special mission employment. It conducts intelligence-led strike and detention operations in high-risk and hostile environments in order to isolate the insurgency and to support sustainable [Afghan Government] governance.

Afghan Territorial Force 444 (ATF 444) is a force that conducts operations principally unique to counter-insurgency. Its primary mission is to find, feel, understand and influence (FFUI) the counter-insurgency environment where it operates to isolate the insurgency and to support sustainable [Afghan Government] governance. Its current focus is on operations in Police Zone 707

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 65.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ MOI, Nested Afghan Special Police Strategy, 10 October 2011, pp.4-6.

with a focus in Helmand Province, which will remain in the short to medium term. Long term, MOI will require this capability in other police zones.

The [**Provincial Response Companies (PRC)**] is a 125-man unit specifically manned, trained, and equipped to conduct Special Police operations at the provincial level, as directed by the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP). They are in effect a high-end, quick reaction capability for the province but have a broad capability stretching into Public Order, Quick Reaction Force (QRF) task and Police Evidence Based Operations within the Rule of Law construct.

Investigative and Surveillance Unit (ISU) is a human intelligence based, advanced investigation and surveillance capability, with a focus on Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) and their supporting networks. The unit has teams across the major provinces of Afghanistan making them suitable for employment in national, regional, and provincial level operations. Tashkil SY1391 [2012] will see the number of ISU regional teams increase to 20, which will give each team an organic special police action capability through the Provincial Response Companies for the first time.

Judicial Security Unit (JSU) and Very Important Person Protection Unit (VIPPU) are national police forces that currently fall under the direction of the GDPSU. These units, while conducting specialized police activity in protecting key [Afghan Government] officials, are not considered special police. Their primary roles are ones of static or local security. As such, MOI will undertake an assessment to determine the best place within the MOI tashkil structure these units will best be situated within the next two years.

Afghan Public Protection Force

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) was created in 2011 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 62 as a “state security force” to replace private security firms.⁶² The APPF is a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) under the direct command and control of the MOI.⁶³ In order to provide adequate time to transition security services from private security firms to the APPF, a Bridging Strategy was signed, which provides that “all development fixed site security, all convoy security, and all commercial security will transition to APPF by 20 March [2012]. ISAF bases, construction projects and fixed site security must transition by 20 March 2013.”⁶⁴ The bridging strategy expired in March 2013. “Since then, only verbal assurances have been given there will be no enforcement of Presidential Decree 62....The Minister of the Interior signed a

⁶² National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 32. Presidential Decree No. 62, August 2010.

⁶³ National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 32.

⁶⁴ MOI, Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF)(accessed Nov. 6, 2013): <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5728>.

memorandum on September 2, 2013 recommending a two-year extension of the SOE Charter and sent it to the Afghan National Security Council (NSC) for approval. As of [November 2013], however, the charter had not been approved.”⁶⁵

The APPF currently has more than 20,000 personnel with an end-strength goal of 25,000.⁶⁶ The APPF is not a police force and does not have the authority to conduct investigations or make arrests.⁶⁷ The APPF “conduct all non-diplomatic commercial, development fixed-site and convoy security services.”⁶⁸ The APPF is headquartered in Kabul with eight regional headquarters in Gardez, Helmand, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Shamshad.⁶⁹ The APPF Training Center in Kabul provides instruction on static, convoy, and personal security.⁷⁰ It should be noted, however, that private security company guards “that have been trained and certified by their employer [do] not have to attend training at the ATC.”⁷¹ In November 2013, the DOD reported:⁷²

Within the last two years, the APPF has made significant progress, and has successfully demonstrated a growing capability to perform the security services formerly performed by [Private Security Companies]. Specifically; they are currently carrying out successful convoy security while also providing effective ISAF base security, and security for governmental, international and non-governmental organizations. The APPF face a number of challenges, however, and are a much less mature force than the other security forces in Afghanistan. The APPF requires fundamental legal, structural, and financial management reforms to ensure long-term viability.

According to the National Police Strategy, the MOI created a working group “with international community representatives appointed by the [International Police Coordination Board (IPCB)] to supervise and direct” the APPF over the next five years.⁷³ The working group “is to provide advice on, but not limited to, the following areas: APPF funding, command and control structures, size, shape, role, recruitment and vetting, training, equipment and the regulation of private security companies.”⁷⁴ The United States does not provide any defense articles to the APPF.⁷⁵

⁶⁵ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 66.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 67; MOI, Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF)(accessed Nov. 6, 2013):

<http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5728>.

⁶⁷ MOI, Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF)(accessed Nov. 6, 2013): <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5728>.

⁶⁸ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 66.

⁶⁹ MOI, Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF)(accessed Nov. 6, 2013): <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5728>.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*.

⁷¹ *Ibid*.

⁷² *Ibid*.

⁷³ National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, pp. 32-33.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*.

⁷⁵ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 67.

Afghan Local Police

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established in 2010 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 3196.⁷⁶ The ALP was created to “ensure the security of local communities and pave the way for reconstruction, development, and political stability.”⁷⁷ The ALP is under the command and control of the MOI, but it is not a police force. The ALP does not have the authority to conduct investigations or make arrests.⁷⁸

The ALP is considered a community/village-based defense organization. It “is the principal component of the [Village Stability Operation (VSO)] initiative. The program utilizes U.S. [Special Operations Forces], coalition forces, and other ANSF to train Afghans in rural areas to defend their communities against threats from insurgents and militant groups.”⁷⁹ “The VSO/ALP programs aim to promote progress along three lines of operation: governance, development and security.”⁸⁰ The ALP governing document is the Afghan Local Police Establishment Procedures. The validation process for establishing an ALP unit is described as follows:⁸¹

VSO is a bottom-up program that is built around the premise of improving local governance, development, and security. When VSO is correctly administered, village leadership is tied into district, provincial, and national governance to provide a self-sustaining system where village concerns, personnel, and logistics issues can be addressed once ALP are fielded. When a district has met certain established benchmarks, the district convenes a *shura* to codify commitment to [the Government of Afghanistan] and support for the ALP. This *shura* is typically attended by district and provincial leadership [Provincial Governor/District Governor, Provincial Chief of Police/District Chief of Police], village elders, as well as representatives from the MOI. This *shura* concludes by officially validating the district and ALP *tashkil*, and signals the start of the ALP process.

Village elders in the validated district vet individuals (men) of their village to serve as ALP. Under the control and supervision of the MOI, as codified in ALP policy and establishment procedures, candidates are screened and biometrically registered prior to the three-week formal training course at the nearest regional or provincial training center. The training includes core classes on the Afghan Constitution, policies, ethics, rule of law, use of force, and human rights. Additionally candidates undergo marksmanship, medical, battle drills, checkpoint

⁷⁶ Presidential Decree No. 3196, 16 August 2010; see also National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 33.

⁷⁷ National Police Strategy, *supra* note 2, p. 33.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 69.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

procedures, and other training relevant to their operational employment. An effort is currently underway to expand and accredit the training course as a four-week program, to allow for expanded instruction on rule of law, fourteen hours of human rights education, and supplemental administrative and logistics classes.

Following graduation from training, the candidate takes his place in his village as an ALP Guardian.

As of November 2013, ALP Guardians numbered 24,169 serving in 119 districts covering 29 provinces.⁸² The ALP end-strength goal is 45,000.⁸³ The VSO/ALP program is designed to transition ALP through three “tiers” from District Overwatch (Tier 1), to Provincial Overwatch (Tier 2), to Complete Transition to the Afghan Government (Tier 3).⁸⁴ The chart below identifies the status of the ALP units as of November 2013.⁸⁵ The ALP is on track to be fully transitioned to Afghan government control by October 2014.⁸⁶ Within ten years the MOI envisions the ALP will be integrated into the AUP.⁸⁷

ALP WEEKLY DISPOSITION		
District Categorization	Districts	ALP On Hand
District Overwatch (Tier 1)	25	4,466
Provincial Overwatch (Tier 2)	17	2,629
Completed Transition to GIRoA (Tier 3)	77	17,112
Unendorsed	0	0
Unvalidated	51	79 *
Totals	170	24,286

* - Category Pending

Similar to past attempts to establish local defense organizations, the ALP is challenged by “recruitment and vetting, professionalism, clear understanding of mission and management, and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of segments of the Afghan population.”⁸⁸ In September 2012,

⁸² Ibid, pp. 3 & 69.

⁸³ Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), *The Afghan War in 2013, Meeting the Challenges of Transition, Vol. III Security and the ANSF* by Anthony H. Cordesman, May 2013, p. 115.

⁸⁴ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 70.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 71.

⁸⁷ MOI Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police: 1393-1402 (2013-2023), p. 12:

<http://ipcb.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/13-04-02-ten-year-vision-english-final-version.pdf>.

⁸⁸ Civil-Military Fusion Center (CFC), *Village Defence: Understanding the Afghan Local Police (ALP)*, July 2011 (hereinafter CFC Village Defence: Understanding the ALP), p. 3:

ISAF suspended Special Forces training for the ALP due to the increased number of insider attacks on coalition forces. The Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) re-validated all of the ALP personnel.⁸⁹ “Navigating the blurry line between legitimate community safe-keepers and rogue militias will prove a major challenge and priority for the ALP and its overseers in the Afghan MOI and international community.”⁹⁰ The DOD noted the following:⁹¹

[a]s the community-based component of the layered security apparatus, ALP rely on district and provincial leaders for sustainment, direction, and support. Poor or weak leaders are subject to co-opting by powerbrokers, in some cases delegitimizing the program and undermining its effectiveness. In most districts, the ALP has other ANSF that can serve as both a quick reaction force and as a partnered force. The level at which these layered security forces interact varies widely depending on the region. More emphasis from MOI, deliberate collaboration at the ministerial level with [the Ministry of Defense], and emplacement of ALP representatives at key district, provincial and regional [command and control] nodes could reinforce the ALP ability to provide security at the district and village level.

Enabling Forces

As noted earlier, the Afghan Government and ISAF “made a deliberate decision several years ago to focus on the rapid growth of the ANSF, followed by the development of enablers and professionalization of the ranks. This decision was made with a full understanding that the ANSF, once built to size, would then need to develop logistics, personnel management, and leadership skills, among others.”⁹² The security forces are near their end-strength goal, and as expected the “strength of the security pillars is counterbalanced by weaknesses in critical support functions. The Logistics, Facilities, Information, Communication, and Technology Departments [of the MOI] still require coalition assistance and are not expected to be fully capable by December, 2014.”⁹³

Training and Education

In June 2012, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the MOI signed a training center transition plan, which consolidates or closes 31 training sites supported by the international community leaving 13 permanent training centers.⁹⁴ The permanent training

https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20AFG%20Security%20Archive/CFC_Afg_Monthly_Afghan_Local_Police_Jul-11.pdf.

⁸⁹ DOD Progress Report DEC 2012, *supra* note 15, p. 79.

⁹⁰ CFC, Village Defence: Understanding the ALP, *supra* note 88, p. 6.

⁹¹ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 73.

⁹² *Ibid*, p. 33.

⁹³ *Ibid*, p. 40.

⁹⁴ See DoD Progress Report July 2013, *supra* note 13, p. 80.

centers are under the authority of the ANP Training General Command (ANPTGC).⁹⁵ In addition, each provincial headquarter has its own Provincial Training Company. The ANPTGC is working to professionalize the police force focusing on “reform training” for untrained patrolmen and recruiting for direct NCO training.⁹⁶

Logistics

In 2011, the ANP logistics development was described as being in a “nascent state” “heavily reliant on Coalition logistical support.”⁹⁷ Today, the MOI is still not capable of supporting ANP operations without coalition assistance.⁹⁸ As more fully discussed in Chapter 8.5, ISAF’s main focus is building the capacity of the MOI’s logistics department.

The MOI has established the National Logistics Center (NLC) in Wardak. The NLC is “the hub for all MOI supply and maintenance activities. It provides significant capacity and capability to perform all levels of maintenance, as well as distribute almost every class of supply. Supply and maintenance support is further pushed out to the provinces through the use of Regional Logistics Centers (RLC), MOI Supply Points (MSP), and contracted mobile maintenance contact teams. Despite these capabilities, most customers remain disconnected from the process, resulting in sub-optimization of the system. AUP equipping lags the ANA overall and is at 70 percent.”⁹⁹

Recruitment

ANP Recruitment is the responsibility of the ANP General Recruiting Command (GRC). International advisors are working with the ANP GRC leadership “to recruit and screen enough qualified patrolmen and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to produce a sustainable and enduring professional force. A key ISAF goal is to develop the ability of the MOI human resources staff to provide the RGC with accurate recruiting needs, which would enable recruiting based on true *tashkil* requirements and prevent the misalignment of *tashkil* personnel (i.e., patrolmen occupying NCO positions). The Senior Recruiting Advisor is working with the General Director of Personnel, Tashkil Directorate and GRC advisors to address this issue.”¹⁰⁰

Recently, the recruitment department took on the responsibility for ALP in-processing.¹⁰¹ The department, however, has lost a significant number of staff.¹⁰² “This increased responsibility,

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ See *ibid*, pp. 80-81.

⁹⁷ Inspectors General U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, *Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness*, November 2006, p. ii.

<http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/76103.pdf>

⁹⁸ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 40

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

coupled with reduced capacity, has threatened the department's overall effectiveness. Significant efforts are underway to streamline the recruit, train, and assignment process.”¹⁰³

Medical

At the end of September 2013, 281 physicians were assigned to the ANP.¹⁰⁴ “The MOI has command and control of medical staffing within Kabul, but still has limited control outside the city.”¹⁰⁵ As a result, the MOI faces “problems filling physician positions in the region” and many “of the 136 MOI clinics are under-staffed.”¹⁰⁶ The ANP also has a higher fatality rate from casualties (37.7 percent) than the Afghan National Army.¹⁰⁷ The ANP has a new medical logistics system, but “due to the lack of consistent, reliable processes and coordination procedures,” the distribution of medical supplies across the country is inconsistent.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report, Oct 2013, p. 101: <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-10-30qr.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 44.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. The fatality rate for ANP casualties is down from the 2012 rate of 44.5 percent.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

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