

8.6: Challenges Facing the Afghan National Police

Summary

This chapter looks at the major challenges facing Afghanistan's police force including illiteracy, leadership development, a militarized force, attrition/casualties, corruption, and narcotics.

Introduction

The Afghan National Police (ANP) work in an extremely difficult environment. Afghans identify insecurity as the number one issue currently facing Afghanistan as a whole.¹ The ANP are expected to serve as a counterinsurgency force and a civilian police force. Their role in securing the country is vital, and yet fraught with challenges. The police force is largely illiterate, corruption is pervasive, and drug use is a problem. The ANP are expected to shift from a highly militarized force to a civilian police force, yet they continue to experience the highest number of casualties. Although the Afghan Uniform Police exhibit signs of leadership strength at the tactical level, leadership overall continues to be an issue in the ANP. The ANP will also face the challenge of sustaining the police force in the decade of transformation with uncertain support from the international community.

Illiteracy

Literacy is the foundation of a professional police force. Illiterate policemen cannot perform the full spectrum of professional police duties. Basic literacy skills are required to check identification documents, read license plate numbers, report incidents, and account for equipment. One of the major challenges facing the ANP, and a fundamental obstacle to development, is illiteracy.² To “the degree that the ANP is manned by illiterate personnel, it cannot meet the performance standards of a fully professional police force.”³ The current illiteracy rate of the ANP is unknown, but it is conservatively estimated at over 70 percent; the national literacy rate is about 28 percent.⁴

¹ See Asia Foundation: A Survey of the Afghan People 2013, p.6:
<http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/2013AfghanSurvey.pdf>.

² See The EU's Afghan Police Mission, House of Lords, European Union Committee, 8th Report of Session 2010–11, 16 February 2011 (hereinafter EU's Afghan Police Mission), p. 17, para. 55:
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldcom/87/87.pdf>.

³ Inspectors General U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, November 2006 (hereinafter OIG Interagency Assessment), p. 23:
<http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/76103.pdf>.

⁴ The current available statistics lump the ANA and ANP together reporting on the overall ANSF total recruits who have completed literacy training. Although the number of recruits in literacy training is broken down between

Because the national literacy rates are so low, recruitment standards had to be lowered and training compromised.⁵ Literate police officers, an already diminutive number, were recruited into the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) affecting “the viability of the overall force.”⁶ Heavy attrition (discussed below) drained the original ANCOP forces “and the need to quickly recruit large numbers to expand ANCOP necessitated lowering standards” even for this elite unit.⁷ In June 2011, it was reported that 94 percent of ANCOP personnel were illiterate.⁸

In October 2009, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) initiated a literacy program.⁹ As of September 30, 2013, it reported over 165,00 ANP personnel had completed a literacy program:¹⁰

- 81,170 Level 1 graduates
- 51,500 Level 2 graduates
- 33,263 Level 3 graduates

The Literacy Levels are based on the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) standard.¹¹ At Level 1 an individual can “read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole numbers. At Level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. At Level 3, an individual has achieved functional literacy and can ‘identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and use printed and written materials.’”¹²

Although thousands of police officers have reportedly been through some form of literacy training, the lack of personnel records makes it impossible to determine the actual literacy rate of active ANP officers.¹³ In November 2013, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) reported that

ANA and ANP, there is no method to determine the overall percentage of literacy within the ANP. See U.S. Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013 (hereinafter DOD Progress Report NOV 2013), p. 42:

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.

⁵ See Royal United Services Institute & Foreign Policy Research Institute, *Reforming the Afghan National Police*, Sept. 2009: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/ANP_Nov09.pdf.

⁶ United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Special Report 307, *Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police Victim of Its Own Success*, by Robert M. Perito, May 2012 (hereinafter USIP ANCOP), p. 9:

<http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR307.pdf>; see also EU’s Afghan Police Mission, *supra* note 2, p. 17, para. 24

⁷ *Ibid*, USIP ANCOP, p. 9. ANCOP recruits were required to have at least a sixth-grade level of literacy.

⁸ Project 2049 Institute, *The Police Challenge: Advancing Afghan National Police Training*, Afghan National Police Reform Working Group, July 13, 2011, p. 9:

http://project2049.net/documents/police_challenge_advancing_afghan_national_police_training.pdf.

⁹ U.S. Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Quarterly Report to Congress April 30, 2013, p. 102: <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-10-30qr.pdf>. The German’s also initiated a literacy program for the northern regions of Afghanistan. See Chapter 8.5: International Support to the Afghan National Police.

¹⁰ SIGAR Quarterly Report October 30, 2013, p. 100: <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-10-30qr.pdf>.

¹¹ SIGAR Quarterly Report April 2013, *supra* note 9, p. 102.

¹² *Ibid*, pp. 102-103.

¹³ *Ibid*.

illiteracy in the ANP continues to inhibit progress.¹⁴ The Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) is expected to add eight-weeks of literacy training to the Initial Police Training Course to institutionalize literacy training; however, it still “relies on NTM-A and UNESCO to continue literacy training, predominantly for fielded units.”¹⁵

Leadership Development

“Police forces require capable leadership and management. It requires structures of administration, command and management, criminal statistics databases, operating policies and codes of conduct, and human resource management. For example, police require adequate and accountable logistical systems to supply the police with resources and equipment. In short, the police require a ministry that can manage, sustain and support it. Nevertheless, while it is one of the most critical aspects of reform, the bureaucratic agency responsible for the police is also one of the most neglected areas of reform, from Iraq to East Timor and beyond.”¹⁶

Police reform efforts in Afghanistan did not prioritize the development of the Ministry of Interior. Priority was placed on generating the forces. The constant increase in the size of the police – from an original 62,000 to its current 157,000 end-strength goal- has resulted in leadership issues. From the beginning Afghanistan lacked “an experienced middle-ranking level of leadership in the Afghan police. The Minister [of Interior] acknowledged that experience could not be invented. It was not possible suddenly to have ‘officers who are native to Afghanistan with 20 years’ civilian background experience.’”¹⁷ In 2008, the MOI completed rank reform “with the total number of officers going from 15,001 to 6,820.”¹⁸

Leadership development became a focus and priority for the international community in 2010/2011. The European Union Police Mission Afghanistan (EUPOL) established a Police Staff College and Crime Management College to train senior leaders of the ANP and detectives.¹⁹ By March 2011, U.S. commanders had “made leadership development within the ANP a top priority. They [...] strongly supported MOI efforts to remove the incompetent and corrupt among the ministry and the ANP, to promote MOI and ANP personnel based on performance, and to expand police training programs focused on creating the next generation of police leaders.”²⁰ The development of leaders, however, has not kept pace with the rapidly expanding personnel numbers. “The AUP continues to face a shortage of officers and NCOs. To make up the NCO shortage, MOI Recruiting Command has focused on recruiting NCOs, and to

¹⁴ See DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 4, pp. 3; 60-61; 65.

¹⁵ See *ibid*, pp. 42-43.

¹⁶ *Reforming the Afghan National Police*, *supra* note 5, p. 58.

¹⁷ EU’s Afghan Police Mission, *supra* note 2, pp. 16-17.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2009 (hereinafter DOD Progress Report June 2009), p. 37:

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/1230_June%20AD2009Final.pdf.

¹⁹ EUPOL Afghanistan, Training Component: <http://www.eupol-afg.eu/?q=police-training>; see Chapter 8.5.

²⁰ OIG Interagency Assessment, *supra* note 3, p. iii.

date, they are averaging 1,046 NCO recruits per month. In general, however, suitable officer and NCO candidates take time to identify and train.”²¹

The decision by ISAF and the U.S. to focus on force generation also meant the bulk of support went to the training and equipping the operational forces and not developing the enabling/support forces.²² As a result, the ANP logistics system is unable to support operational needs.²³ With the forces nearing their end-strength goal, ANP assistance shifted to developing the enabling forces – specifically logistics in mid-2011.²⁴ In November 2013, the DOD reported that the “ability of the ANP to sustain itself long-term is at risk without significant improvements in their logistical capabilities.”²⁵

The significant number of changes in the top MOI leadership has also hindered reform efforts. In September 2013, the 10th Minister of Interior was appointed.²⁶ “In contrast, the [Ministry of Defense] has had three ministers during a similar period. These frequent changes in MOI leadership are indicative of the political pressures directed at the MOI, and the resulting turmoil is disruptive to the pace of ministerial development.”²⁷

The lack of leadership obviously affects command and control issues. As discussed in Chapter 8.3, the MOI is in the process of changing the command and control structure of the ANP away from zone commanders (created around ISAF’s command structure) to regional commands. There “remains a great deal of confusion related to the implementation of this new [headquarter] structure”²⁸ and the “full implementation and consequences of this decision” have yet to be seen.²⁹ Without good leaders loyal to the central government the ANP could splinter along ethnic and geographic lines supporting local power-brokers post-2014. A recent report noted leadership continues to be a challenge for the ANP:³⁰

Within the ANP, some units do not yet have commanders. Additionally, poor leaders that were previously removed from duty have been appointed to fill vacant

²¹ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 4, p. 65.

²² U.S. Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2012, p. 35: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf; *see also* U.S. Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012 (hereinafter DOD Progress Report DEC 2012), pp. 70-71: http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_Report_final.pdf.

²³ *See* DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 4, p. 40; *see also* OIG Interagency Assessment, *supra* note 3, p. 55.

²⁴ *See* DOD Progress Report DEC 2012, *supra* note 22, pp. 70-71; *see also* Chapter 8.5: International Support to the ANP.

²⁵ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 4, p. 61.

²⁶ *See* *ibid*, p. 39.

²⁷ *Ibid*.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 60.

²⁹ U.S. Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013 (hereinafter DOD Progress Report July 2013), p. 79:

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Section_1230_Report_July_2013.pdf.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 61.

positions. ISAF continues to engage key leaders to encourage MOI and ANP leaders to address cases of inadequate leadership. In general, subordinate empowerment, initiative, and delegation of authority need improvement in the police.

Militarized Police Force

The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and the police assistance efforts focused on security concerns has created a highly militarized police force. Although the U.S. has been criticized for allowing its military to lead the force generation stage of police reform, it has also been acknowledged that “the U.S. military filled a vacuum no other actor was capable of occupying.”³¹

One of the strategic objectives the MOI has set for the ANP is become a civilian police force.³² Currently, the police are expected to continue to support security/counter-insurgency operations and also perform traditional law enforcement and civilian policing duties.³³ The ability to perform civilian police duties, however, is limited. The training and support needed to create a reconstituted police force is still unclear.³⁴ In addition, the major international participants “have differing perspectives on the task, timing, and objectives of reforming the ANP.”³⁵ NTM-A and ISAF believe transition of the police can and will occur over time as security conditions improve.³⁶ “A slow but steady transition from counterinsurgency to civilian police functions, requiring new training in key competencies, will take place over ten years and include links to judicial reform and rule of law-related requirements.”³⁷ The United Nations (UN) officials, however, believe that community policing does not have to wait until security improves and these skills should have been part of the program from the beginning.³⁸ “UN officers are concerned about what happens when NTM-A disappears, observing that it will take a huge political commitment and major resources to remake the ANP. To make matters worse, no one is stepping up to replace NTM-A, not even the United Nations. The [International Police

³¹ *Reforming the Afghan National Police*, *supra* note 5, p. 89.

³² See Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOI), Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy Department of Strategy, Afghan National Police Strategy 1389 (December 2010)(hereinafter National Police Strategy): <http://ipcb.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/nps-final-version.pdf>; Afghan National Police Plan Solar Years (SY) 1392-1393, March 2013, provided by Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Ministry of Interior Ministerial Advisory Group (MOI-MAG); Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police: 1393-1402 (2013-2023), signed 22 April 2013 (hereinafter ANP Ten-Year Vision): <http://ipcb.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/13-04-02-ten-year-vision-english-final-version.pdf>. These policy documents are discussed in Chapter 8.2: Legal and Policy Framework of the Afghan National Police.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ See USIP Special Report 322, *Police Transition in Afghanistan*, by Donald J. Planty and Robert M. Perito, February 2013, p. 2: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR322.pdf>.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁶ See *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

Coordination Board] has no authority or resources and the European Union and EUPOL have no appetite for taking on the task of reforming the ANP.”³⁹ Reform will ultimately be the MOI’s responsibility, but success will require international assistance for years to come.

Attrition/Casualties

The ANP continues to suffer from high attrition rates. In February 2011, it was reported that “2/3 of the trained police officers quit their service only a few weeks after the end of their formation.”⁴⁰ The identified causes included low pay, extended deployments from home, and high casualty rates.⁴¹ In March 2009, the ANP salaries were brought to the same level as the Afghan National Army (ANA) pay. Efforts to increase pay and standardize rotations have helped stabilize the force. “Since 2011, attrition levels for the ANP have remained at an annual rate of 25 percent overall with attrition rates of up to 70 or 80 percent in some units.”⁴² Attrition rates for the ANP have more recently been reported at 1.4 percent per month (16.8 percent annual), but specific concerns about high attrition within the General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) remain.⁴³ Moreover, the way attrition is reported changed in February 2013. According to DOD, “[a]t the end of February [2013], the ANP began reporting attrition as only unanticipated losses to the ANP. ‘Dropped From Rolls’ (DFR) and ‘Other’ have replaced ‘AWOL’ and ‘WIA’ as counting toward attrition. ‘Other’ are members who have left the ANP because they disappeared, were captured, or were transferred to other ANSF units.”⁴⁴ Regardless, an annual attrition rate of 16 percent equates to the entire police force being replaced in just over six years.

Afghanistan’s security situation has put the ANP on the front lines of fighting. The ANP have consistently suffered higher casualty rates compared to the ANA. Between January 2007 and March 2009, “some 3,400 Afghan police were killed or wounded.”⁴⁵ “Police combat losses during 2008 were three times larger than those of the Afghan National Army, with police suffering an average of 56 officers killed per month.”⁴⁶ In 2009, the ANP lost 639 police officers compared to 292 members of the ANA.⁴⁷ By 2012, Afghan police casualties rose to 300 per month, still averaging twice as many as the Afghan Army.⁴⁸ In 2013, ANP casualties continued to significantly rise. The MOI reported 299 ANP casualties between mid-May and

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ EU’s Afghan Police Mission, *supra* note 2, p. 46.

⁴¹ See Ibid.

⁴² USIP *Police Transition in Afghanistan*, *supra* note 34, p. 5.

⁴³ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 4, p. 66.

⁴⁴ DOD Progress Report DEC 2012, *supra* note 22, p. 68, ftnt. 25.

⁴⁵ USIP Special Report 227, *Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform*, by Robert M. Perito, August 2009, pp. 8-9: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_police_0.pdf.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 9.

⁴⁷ EU’s Afghan Police Mission, *supra* note 2, p. 46.

⁴⁸ USIP *Police Transition in Afghanistan*, *supra* note 34, p. 5.

mid-June of 2013—“a 22% increase over the same period in 2012.”⁴⁹ At the beginning of September 2013, the MOI reported 1,792 police officers had been killed since March and 2,700 were wounded.⁵⁰ The Afghan Local Police (ALP) are suffering even higher casualty rates. “Taking into account force strength, in August 2013, ALP suffered a monthly casualty rate of 124 per 10,000 Guardians in August 2013, nearly five times higher than the ANA (27/10,000) and more than four times higher than the ANP (32/10,000).”⁵¹

The main driver for the significant increase in ANP casualties, according to the DOD, “is the ANSF taking the lead for security across Afghanistan and the concurrent increase in unilateral and ANSF-led operations.”⁵² Current efforts to reduce ANP casualties include: increased fielding of [personal protection equipment], increased [Trauma Assistance Personnel] medic training, and an aggressive [Combat Lifesaver] training program.”⁵³

Corruption

As discussed in Volume 4, corruption in Afghanistan is one of the most significant factors undermining development in all sectors including security. The police have been associated with everything from petty extortion to drug trafficking. “Fraud and corruption in the ANP has institutionalised, driving the organization’s internal workings.”⁵⁴ In 2009, corruption in the ANP in the form of bribery, extortion, and embezzlement was described as follows:⁵⁵

Extortion by police officers is depressingly common, greasing the wheels of day-to-day police operations. Goods are demanded from shopkeepers, ‘taxes’ levied on vehicles at highway checkpoints, and ‘fines’ imposed on the unlucky public unable to produce identification documents. Taxi drivers for example are often forced to pay traffic police in Kabul between \$0.20 and \$6 each day.

In areas where police cannot be paid electronically into their accounts, local police administrators cream off a percentage of individual officer’s already meagre salaries. Other police chiefs continue a long tradition of collecting the wages of nonexistent ‘ghost policemen’ – fictitious names on personnel rolls – thousands of which haunt the ANP. In just one region where the US conducted a

⁴⁹ SIGAR Quarterly Report Oct 2013, *supra* note 10, p. 82.

⁵⁰ The Guardian, Afghan forces suffering too many casualties, says top NATO commander, September 2, 2013: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/02/afghan-forces>; see also SIGAR Quarterly Report Oct 2013, *supra* note 10, p. 82.

⁵¹ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 4, p. 72.

⁵² *Ibid*, p. 58.

⁵³ *Ibid*.

⁵⁴ *Reforming the Afghan National Police*, *supra* note 5, p. 10.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 9 and 10.

survey to investigate corruption, officials ‘found only 1,200 officers at work in an area where Afghan commanders claimed 3,300 officers were serving.

Without payment of bribes, the ability of an individual to progress up the organisational chain is virtually impossible. ‘All posts are sold with a predetermined price’ one senior police official claimed; some for staggering amounts of money. Corruption is such a lucrative growth industry on Afghanistan’s highways that reports suggest police chief posts along major drug transit or transport routes such as Balu Beluk, have been auctioned off for as much as \$200,000 to \$300,000. In return, police commanders in eastern Afghanistan can hope to recoup \$400,000 a month.

Corruption in the ANP also takes the form of nepotism and patronage. The same 2009 report quoted a respondent from Jalalabad stating: “admission, selection, appointment and promotion process[es] are all based on corruption rather than merit’, explaining that ‘the more corrupt you are, the higher the position you can get. Police are all selected, appointed and promoted based on their associations with warlords and corrupt high-level government officials, in the Ministry of Interior and in the Parliament. The more corrupt you are, the better off you are and the more you are encouraged.’”⁵⁶

Reform efforts targeting corruption in the ANP and MOI have been introduced. Initial efforts at training the police, however, were undermined when the newly trained police were assigned to work in pervasively corrupt environments. “Clean police, Afghan officers say, can only hope to stay honest for the most three months on the job.”⁵⁷ The AUP, the ‘face’ of the Afghan police, still lacks “a merit based promotion and appointment system.”⁵⁸ Patronage networks and corruption are reportedly “still rampant” in the Afghan Border Police.⁵⁹ In a 2013 survey, Afghans reported routinely experiencing corruption in a wide range of situations, including when encountering the ANP.⁶⁰ “Nationally, 37% of respondents say they experienced corruption in their dealings with the ANP.”⁶¹

Corruption in the ANP and MOI is “compounded by political interference.”⁶² As previously mentioned, the significant number of changes in MOI leadership is indicative of the political pressures directed at the MOI. The MOI faces “a very difficult political environment and [has]

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 10.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 4, p. 65.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 64.

⁶⁰ Asia Foundation: A Survey of the Afghan People 2013, *supra* note 1, p. 10.

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 41.

⁶² *Reforming the Afghan National Police*, *supra* note 5, p. 10.

no common direction on addressing corruption.”⁶³ The slow pace of ministerial development is contrasted with the progress made within the Ministry of Defense, which has been “propelled by strong political commitment over several years at [the] Ministerial Level.”⁶⁴ Even reform minded ministers at the MOI have been unable to dismantel the patronage networks affiliated largely with the northern mujahideens that were established in the MOI during the early years following the 2001 Bonn Conference. Today these networks “have reemerged as the dominant faction in the MOI.”⁶⁵

The current Minister of Interior, Minister Omar Daudzi, has reportedly made countering corruption a priority. Soon after taking office the Minister and the Deputy Minister for Security “fired a number of commanders he perceived to be corrupt.”⁶⁶ “In the short term this appears to be a postivie step forward, but the long-term will determine whether this is an actual attempt to stop corruption or merely a move to make space for people from their own patronage network.”⁶⁷ Future anti-corruption activities within the MOI may be significantly delayed due to staffing cuts in the Inspector General (IG) department.⁶⁸ The MOI has “reduced its inspector general staff and has not reinstated inspectors general at the provincial level.”⁶⁹

Narcotics

Drug use by the ANP has been a problem despite drug testing. According to the drug testing procedure, recruits for the Focused District Development (FDD) training who tested positive for opium were released from the training while those who tested positive for hashish or marijuana remained in the program and received counseling on ANP drug policies and prevention.⁷⁰ In 2008, 16 percent of the ANP tested positive for narcotics use.⁷¹ In 2009, the British Foreign Office estimated that 60 percent of the ANP in Helmand used drugs.⁷² In 2012, drug use was still being reported as a reason for ANP training attrition.⁷³ Although current statistics of drug use by the ANP are unknown, public perception surveys continue to point to endemic drug use across the ANP:⁷⁴

⁶³ SIGAR Quarterly Report Oct 2013, *supra* note 10, p. 138.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 138.

⁶⁵ DOD Progress Report July 2013, *supra* note 29, p. 59.

⁶⁶ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 4, p. 40

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 64.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 40

⁶⁹ SIGAR Quarterly Report Oct 2013, *supra* note 10, p. 138.

⁷⁰ DOD Progress Report June 2009, *supra* note 18, p. 38.

⁷¹ USIP *Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform*, *supra* note 45, p. 8.

⁷² *See Ibid*; *see also Reforming the Afghan National Police*, *supra* note 5, p. 101.

⁷³ DOD Progress Report DEC 2012, *supra* note 22, p. 69.

⁷⁴ UNDP Annual Police Perception & Victimization Survey - 2011, pg. 21:

<http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/2011/PPS-Eng%20Version-2011%20Final%20Lowest%20Res.pdf>.

In a separate question, a troubling number of Afghans, more than three in 10, report that they or a member of their household have seen a member of the ANP using drugs or narcotics, up five points since last year; 18 percent say they are personally aware of an ANP officer participating in the drug or narcotics trade. Unlike other police misdeeds, an increase in drug abuse primarily is reported in Central Kabul, where 41 percent now say they've seen an ANP officer use drugs and 19 percent report police involvement in drug trafficking – up by 21 points and 9 points, respectively, in and around the capital area.

ANP officers have also been involved in the drug trade. By way of example, a “border police vehicle stopped outside Kabul in 2007 was found to contain 123.5kg of heroin, valued at nearly \$300,000. Emblematic of Afghanistan’s descent into narco-statehood, the five men inside, including an officer, three policemen and a secretary, were later found to be under the command of Haji Zahir, formerly Border Police commander in Nangarhar province.”⁷⁵

As discussed in Chapter 5.1, there is a nexus between narcotics, corruption, and security issues in Afghanistan. “Corrupt officials exploit narcotics as a reliable source of revenue and patronage.”⁷⁶ Narcotics revenue threatens security by strengthening the powers of non-state actors at the expense of the government. Although interference with criminal cases remains an issue, some progress can be seen by the conviction of the provincial police chief from Nimroz on drug corruption and obstruction of justice charges.⁷⁷ In addition, Major General Mohammad Kabir Andarabi, “the highest ranking government official arrested on drug charges to date,” received a 10-year prison sentence.⁷⁸

The Decade of Transformation

The Decade of Transformation begins in 2015, following the end of the transition period and the withdrawal of international security forces in Afghanistan. “The approach of the 2014 withdrawal deadline has sharpened the focus on a number of issues related to the Afghan police development program, including the efficacy of the current police structure and the budget needed to sustain the force in the coming decade. Another major issue involves who will provide the training, equipment, and technical assistance the Afghan police will require beyond the 2014 deadline.”⁷⁹

The “ANSF will be challenged to close a number of capability gaps in areas where ISAF currently provides support. Afghanistan’s security ministries, despite substantial progress, still

⁷⁵ *Reforming the Afghan National Police*, *supra* note 5, pp. 9-10.

⁷⁶ Congressional Research Services Report for Congress RL32686, *Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy*, by Christopher M. Blanchard, August 12, 2009 (hereinafter *CRS Narcotics Report*), Summary: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf>.

⁷⁷ See SIGAR Quarterly Report October 2013, *supra* note 10, p. 103.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *USIP Police Transition in Afghanistan*, *supra* note 34, pp. 1-2.

require substantive improvements in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition....The single most important challenge facing the ANSF, however, is in developing an effective logistics and sustainment system.”⁸⁰ Although ISAF has shifted its focus to developing the enabling forces, specifically the logistics capabilities of the ANP, the capabilities are insufficient to support the ANP.⁸¹ MOI’s logistics, facilities, information, communication, and technology departments “are not expected to be fully capable by December, 2014.”⁸²

Moreover, the budget needed to sustain the police force is beyond the Afghan government’s resources. In order to support 157,000 personnel, the ANP will require an estimated \$628.1 million per year “to fund salaries (\$265.7 million), incentives (\$224.2 million), and food (\$138.2 million).”⁸³ Additional funding will be needed for supplies, equipment, maintenance, operations and management of facilities, training, etc. “The residual cost of sustaining the ANSF assistance program after 2014 is estimated at between \$2 billion and \$6 billion, more than the government’s annual budget.”⁸⁴

The international community has pledged its continued support to Afghanistan’s security forces after ISAF’s mandate ends in 2014. NATO’s post-2014 mission, Resolute Support, “will focus on national and institutional-level training and the higher levels of army and police commands across Afghanistan.”⁸⁵ At the Chicago NATO Summit in May 2012, “the international community pledged about [US]\$1 billion per year for three years for the ANSF, beginning in 2015. The Afghan government will provide [US] \$500 million a year during the same period and will progressively increase its contribution over time. The U.S. pledged to seek [US]\$2.5 [billion] per year.”⁸⁶ The Chicago Summit pledges were based on an estimated force of 230,000 with an annual budget of US\$4.1 billion.⁸⁷

The MOI’s 10-year vision of a civilian police force will require not only the long term commitment of funding and resources by the international community, but also the political will and leadership of the Afghan Government. The 2014 Presidential elections will be a bellwether. If the elections are perceived by Afghans as legitimate, the central government has the opportunity to solidify its ability to protect the country and provide law and order to Afghan citizens. If, however, the elections are perceived as corrupt or illegitimate, the ANP could splinter along ethnic and geographic lines supporting local power-brokers.

⁸⁰ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 4, p. 3.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 40.

⁸² *Ibid*.

⁸³ SIGAR Quarterly Report Oct 2013, *supra* note 10, p. 98.

⁸⁴ USIP *Police Transition in Afghanistan*, *supra* note 34, p.1.

⁸⁵ NATO-ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan, ISAF Mission Evolution: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-81EA0569-2EBFC3EA/natolive/topics_69366.htm.

⁸⁶ DOD Progress Report NOV 2013, *supra* note 4, p. 80.

⁸⁷ *See* *ibid*.

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